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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“WHO COUNTS?” “SEZ WHO?”*

SANFORD LEVINSON**
INTRODUCTION: WHY THE TITLE?
When Professor Joel Goldstein called to offer me the opportunity to deliver
the 2013 Childress Lecture, I was, of course, immensely flattered, albeit
immediately intimidated when he added that it would include the participation
as well of a daunting group of commentators. That did not, of course, prevent
me from accepting, though it did lead to writing a paper that was far too long
to be delivered as a single lecture.
For better or worse, I quickly decided upon the title, “Who Counts?”,
though I have subsequently modified it, for reasons that should become clear
later in this Essay, by including the great American question, “Sez Who?” One
reason for the initial title is that both Professor Paul Finkelman and I were
participating at the time in a New York Times online debate1 on what The
Times accurately labeled “The Constitution’s Immoral Compromise” of
counting each slave only as the equivalent of three-fifths of a free person in
computing the population that would serve as the basis for determining the
number of members each state would get in the House of Representatives (and,

* Prepared for delivery (in a truncated form) as the 2013 Childress Lecture at Saint Louis
University School of Law on November 1, 2013. I am immensely grateful not only to Joel
Goldstein and his colleagues for the invitation to deliver this Lecture, but also for the invitations
(and acceptances) of a remarkable array of people who, not surprisingly, offered their own
challenging and perceptive comments during the panels afterward. I am also grateful to Gregory
Deschler and his colleagues on the Saint Louis University Law Journal for their hospitality and
attentiveness to every need. In addition to my gratitude to Professor Goldstein for issuing the
initial invitation, I have also benefited greatly from his detailed comments on an earlier draft of
this Essay. And, as is a constant with anything I write and publish, I am also grateful to Mark
Graber and Jack Balkin for their advice. I appreciate as well helpful feedback from Bob Mnookin.
My discussion of the contemporary controversies over identifying members of American Indian
tribes reflects my opportunity to present my ideas to a seminar at the University of Arkansas
School of Law taught by Dean Stacy L. Leeds. Her seminar included some members of American
Indian tribal councils who provided especially helpful perspectives on the issue.
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, The University
of Texas School of Law; Professor of Government, The University of Texas at Austin.
1. The Constitution’s Immoral Compromise, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 26,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/26/the-constitutions-immoral-compro
mise.
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of course, the Electoral College also). It can truly be said that one of the
dominant questions before the delegates in Philadelphia was “who counts”
(and, of course, how much they count). It has become almost a cliché that
communities are human constructs rather than recognitions of what
philosophers might call “natural kinds,”2 and much of the “American project”
has always involved often acrimonious delineation of highly particularistic
communities.3
“Who counts” and, in addition, who feels that one is in fact “counted” as a
member of a community, are basic questions of politics and, indeed, of almost
all social organization. Perhaps readers can remember—maybe ruefully—
childhood “clubs” that depended as much on who was excluded as who was let
in and, concomitantly, who felt the pleasures of inclusion as against the sting
of exclusion. To put it mildly, the topic is an ambitious one, and this Lecture
only skims the surface of its potential riches. So, as I thought about what I
might want to discuss as the Childress lecturer, especially in the presence of
other distinguished scholars, it occurred to me that an essential topic of the
American past, present, and future is precisely “who counts” as part of the “We
the People” in whose name the framers ostensibly spoke and drafted their
constitutional text in 1787 and under whose aegis we continue to live today. I
shall, however, roam beyond the United States at times, and beyond “standardform” political institutions to illustrate the ubiquity of the question and the
complexity of proposed solutions.
I. ACCOUNTING FOR SLAVERY
Given that this Lecture had its origins, in a sense, in the reality of a
continuing debate over the Constitution’s Three-fifths Clause, it is appropriate
to begin with a further exploration of the paradoxes contained within that
debate. Although one should remember that almost all of the states
countenanced slavery as of 1787, the big winners were the states heavily
dependent on chattel slavery, such as Virginia and South Carolina.4 Many

2. See Alexander Bird & Emma Tobin, Natural Kinds, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/natural-kinds/
(“To say that a kind is natural is to say that it corresponds to a grouping or ordering that does not
depend on humans.”).
3. An essential book on different forms of American community is ROGERS M. SMITH,
CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 14 (1997).
4. See, e.g., the results of the 1790 census regarding the numbers of slaves in the various
states. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, A CENTURY OF POPULATION GROWTH: FROM THE FIRST
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE TWELFTH 1790–1900 132 (1909), available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/00165897ch14.pdf. Only Massachusetts,
Vermont, and Maine were free of slaves. Id. New Hampshire, for example, had 157 slaves. Id.
Leading the pack, though, were Virginia with 292,627 slaves, with South Carolina second with
107,094 slaves. Id.
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historians ascribe Thomas Jefferson’s election in 1800 to the three-fifths bonus
as reflected in the Electoral College.5 Had the slaves not been counted as part
of the relevant population, all American history might well have taken a
radically different course, including, of course, the genuine possibility that
there would have been no Constitution at all and the consequent creation of at
least two, perhaps three, separate countries.
One might say that slaves counted, but only as three-fifths of non-slaves.
But we immediately must confront a paradox surrounding this particular
episode in American history: Anti-slavery forces properly argued that slaves
should not count at all, whereas one can be certain that slave owners would
have been delighted to have them count as the equivalent of five ordinary
people. The reason is obvious: No one suggested that slaves would be able to
vote. Nor, almost as significantly, could anyone seriously have suggested that
slaves would be “virtually represented.” Such representation was evoked with
regard to women or children, non-voting citizens who would, however,
ostensibly be protected by others—fathers, brothers, and husbands—who
would, it was argued, have both the psychological predisposition and moral
obligation to take their interests into account when voting or otherwise
engaging in politics.6
No such claims were made with regard to slaves and their masters. What it
meant to be a chattel slave was precisely that one was another’s property,
entitled to no more solicitude, save that determined by naked self-interest, than
other live chattels such as cattle or horses. A wise owner does not mistreat or
starve his horses, for example, for they are usually productive assets. But not
all owners were wise, and some, at least, no doubt derived sadistic pleasure
from demonstrating the absolute dominion that “ownership” is thought to
bring.7 So the debate had literally nothing to do with protecting the interests of
those who were enslaved. Instead, it concerned only the ability of the actual
electorate (and ruling elites) in a given state to benefit from the presence in
5. See GARRY WILLS, “NEGRO PRESIDENT”: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 1–4
(2003) (demonstrating the importance of the three-fifths compromise to providing Jefferson the
marginal eight electoral votes by which he defeated John Adams).
6. See, e.g., the forthright advice by an early 20th century Minnesota legislator that women
“attach themselves to some man who will represent them in public affairs.” Voting Rights for
Women: Pro- and Anti- Suffrage, EDSITEMENT!, http://edsitement.neh.gov/lesson-plan/votingrights-women-pro-and-anti-suffrage, (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). Of course, “attachment” was
already present with regard to one’s father or brothers, who were also expected to act with
suitable male chivalry.
7. A range of possibilities with regard to slave owners is well developed in 12 Years a
Slave, though, importantly, none is willing to recognize the elemental injustice involved in chattel
slavery. John Ridley, 12 Years a Slave: Best Adapted Screenplay 47–49, 64, 75 (2012). See also
MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND
LITERATURE 1 (2003) (history of canonical North Carolina case establishing absolute dominion
of slave owners).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

940

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:937

their states of totally non-represented non-voters because of the enhanced
political power counting them as “three-fifths persons” would provide these
elites. They might “count” as part of the “apportionment census,”8 but no one
imagined that they would, in fact, “count” as part of the community whose
opinions or interests would ever be taken into account. To count them served
the exclusive interest of slave owners (and their states), not at all the people
purportedly “counted.”
The paradox of “representing” slaves is underscored by the full text of the
relevant constitutional text:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding
9
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.

Not only does it take care to include as full members of the “apportionment
community” indentured servants, who continued to constitute a significant
percentage of the labor force in 1787,10 it also excludes completely “Indians
not taxed,” who are truly treated as non-persons. Perhaps this simply echoes
the extent to which the “compromise” is not only about apportionment, but
also about the ability of Congress to use its newly authorized taxing powers,
which also included a three-fifths clause. After all, slaves could in theory be
taxed as part of the chattel property of their owners, and counting them as only
being worth three-fifths the notional value of other capital assets would be a
boon to the would-be taxpayers.11
Given that “non-assimilated” Indians were not taxed at all inasmuch as
they were viewed as members of separate nations, albeit “domestic dependent”
on the solicitude of the national government,12 they were, similarly, to be
excluded from the census. We should also acknowledge the strong possibility
that many, perhaps almost all, of the “Indians not taxed” had no desire at all to
be included within the American community even in such a minimal way of

8. See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-up in the Core of the
Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3, 3 n.1, 13 (1998).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis
added).
10. See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and
Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 748, 750, 781 (1996).
11. As a matter of fact, this aspect of the three-fifths compromise ended up playing no real
role in American public finance. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 26; see also Bruce
Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–6, 27–28 (1999) (arguing that
“direct taxes” turned out to be almost completely unimportant in public finance, which, by
definition, meant that the three-fifths tax clause also became irrelevant).
12. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 583 (1832), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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being counted as part of its census inasmuch as they viewed the “Americans”
as an occupying army whose claim to power rested on force rather than right.13
To be “counted” against one’s will as part of an alien community would
certainly have not been perceived as an act of friendship.14 Indeed, “Indians”
are not identified as such in the first six U.S. censuses taken by the United
States between 1790–1840.15 Only beginning with the 1900 census were
Indians living on reservations identified by the census.16
Of course, the subject “who counts” also specially resonates in St. Louis;
the splendid new downtown building of Saint Louis University School of Law
is literally only blocks from what has come to be called by many the “Dred
Scott Courthouse”; as we all know, the lawsuit brought by Scott eventuated in
the declaration by the United States Supreme Court that no descendant of
slaves, even if formally free, could be accounted as a member of the national
American political/legal community,17 even if their bodies could continue to
contribute to the enhanced political power, at least at the national level, of
whites oppressing them. Interestingly enough, it appeared that even the Dred
Scott majority accepted the reality that free blacks could be counted as part of a
given state’s political community and even allowed to vote within those
13. John Marshall basically agreed in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584, 589
(1823).
14. Indeed, Chief Justice Taney wrote as follows in Dred Scott, concerning “the Indian
race,” which “formed no part of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated with them in
social connections or in government” and who remained
[A] free and independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by
their own laws. Many of these political communities were situated in territories to which
the white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion. But that claim was acknowledged
to be subject to the right of the Indians to occupy it as long as they thought proper, and
neither the English nor colonial Governments claimed or exercised any dominion over the
tribe or nation by whom it was occupied, nor claimed the right to the possession of the
territory, until the tribe or nation consented to cede it. These Indian Governments were
regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean had separated the
red man from the white; and their freedom has constantly been acknowledged, from the
time of the first emigration to the English colonies to the present day, by the different
Governments which succeeded each other. Treaties have been negotiated with them, and
their alliance sought for in war; and the people who compose these Indian political
communities have always been treated as foreigners not living under our Government.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403–04 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. As to the nature of Indian “consent” to various treaties, see
MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, FATHERS AND CHILDREN: ANDREW JACKSON AND THE SUBJUGATION OF
THE AMERICAN INDIAN XX (Transaction Publishers 2d ed. 1995) (1975); STUART BANNER, HOW
THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 127, 129 (2005).
15. American Indians in the Federal Decennial Census, 1790–1930, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES
& RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/research/census/native-americans/1790-1930.html
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
16. Id.
17. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403, 407, 411.
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states,18 but that was irrelevant so far as computing the more embracing
national community of rightsholders. (At the very least, this underscores the
complexity of answering the question “who counts” and invites the follow-up
question “sez who.”)
The Fourteenth Amendment overruled this aspect of Dred Scott, and the
Fifteenth Amendment ostensibly made it illegal for states to deny at least
African-American males the right to vote in elections. It is, of course, a
historical truth that many feminists opposed both the Fourteenth and,
especially, the Fifteenth Amendments precisely because one could view them
as underscoring the proposition that women, albeit citizens, did not count as
potential members of the American political community, save to the degree
they were virtually represented or enjoyed certain limited rights as citizens.19 It
would take another half-century for the Nineteenth Amendment to guarantee
women the right to vote and whatever recognition the suffrage brings as a
member of the community that “counts.”

18. See id. at 405.
[A person] may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not
be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. For, previous to the
adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State had the undoubted right to
confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its
rights. But this character of course was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave
him no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of
nations and the comity of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of
conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the Constitution of the United States.
Each State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon any
class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the sense in which that
word is used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of
its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other States. The rights
which he would acquire would be restricted to the State which gave them.
Id.
19. Thus the text of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly states, in relevant
part:
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being . . . citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). See also another Missouri case, Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165, 178 (1874) (women’s right to vote not guaranteed by the
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U. S. (16
Wall.) 130, 130, 133, 139 (1872) (women not guaranteed the right to practice law if states wish to
exclude them from the legal profession).
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II. SO WHO COUNTS AS AN “INDIAN”?
Although Taney took great care to distinguish between American Indians
and those we today call African-Americans, noting, for example, that at least
some of the former could become American citizens,20 he took great care to
limit the category of those who could count as Indian. Key in this regard is his
altogether fascinating earlier opinion in United States v. Rogers rejecting the
proposition that a white person could become an Indian.21 For Taney, it is fair
to say, race was everything, trumping all other concerns. Indeed, Kenneth
Prewitt, a distinguished political scientist and former director of the United
States Census Bureau, has recently suggested that our fixation with racial
identity may truly be part of what constitutes American exceptionalism.22
“America [is] the only country in the world firmly wedded to an eighteenthcentury racial taxonomy,” he writes, that continues to structure a great deal of
our public discussion and public policy.23 This taxonomy, by which one is
assigned—counted as—a member of only one of the then-five constitutive
races24 is on full display in Taney’s decision.
As described by Taney, “William S. Rogers, a white man,” had been
indicted for the murder of one “Jacob Nicholson, also a white man, in the
country now occupied and allotted by the laws of the United States to the
Cherokee Indians.”25 Rogers claimed that he had in effect emigrated “to the
Cherokee country, and made it his home,” becoming, along the way, “a citizen
of the Cherokee nation” as determined, of course, by the Cherokee nation
itself.26 His status as a Cherokee citizen would mean that that Rogers would be
exempt from the jurisdiction of the United States, because Congress had
passed a criminal law that included a proviso that it would not “include
punishment for ‘crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property
of another Indian.’”27 Because Nicholson “had in like manner become a
Cherokee Indian,” Rogers claimed that the United States court was without
jurisdiction to try him.28 Perhaps you will permit me to add as an aside that one

20. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 (“But they may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other
foreign Government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State,
and of the United States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his
abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which
would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.”).
21. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572–73 (1846).
22. KENNETH PREWITT, WHAT IS YOUR RACE?: THE CENSUS AND OUR FLAWED EFFORTS
TO CLASSIFY AMERICANS 8 (2013).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 14–17.
25. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 567.
28. Id. at 571.
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reason I love law is that the facts of cases are so endlessly fascinating. One
does not need to engage in exotic hypotheticals. The world itself is so
remarkably interesting!
In any event, Taney (and the Court) did not buy Rogers’s argument. “[W]e
think it very clear, that a white man who at mature age is adopted in an Indian
tribe does not thereby become an Indian, and was not intended to be embraced
in the exception above mentioned.”29 For Taney—and is this surprising?—we
are dealing with what a later generation would learn to call “essentialism,” and
part of “being an Indian” is presumably skin color, as evidenced in the
controversial name of the professional football team of our Nation’s capital.30
Presumably, once white, always white, at least for purposes of the particular
federal statute. (I am not aware what Taney’s views would have been with
regard to a free black who “emigrated” to the Cherokee Nation.) Even if one
stipulates that Rogers “by such adoption [became] entitled to certain privileges
in the tribe, and [made] himself amenable to their laws and usages,”31 that is
basically irrelevant.
Yet he is not an Indian; and the exception is confined to those who by the
usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It
does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally,— of the family
of Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their own tribe, and
32
other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages and customs. . . .

Rogers, however, “was still a white man, of the white race, and therefore not
within the exception in the act of Congress.”33 Presumably, the Cherokee
viewed their identity as “political” as well as “racial,” with a concomitant right
attaching to the Cherokee Nation, like any other political entity, to welcome
newcomers even if they were initially not part of the Nation. One theorist of
British parliamentary sovereignty famously declared that “[i]t is a fundamental
principle with English lawyers, that Parliament can do everything but make a
woman a man, and a man a woman.”34 It similarly appears that the Cherokee
Nation, even if one deems it to have at least some attributes of “sovereignty,”
cannot, according to Taney, change a white man into an Indian.

29. Id. at 572–73. Imagine if the sentence instead read: “We think it very clear that an Italian
who at mature age is granted citizenship in the United States does not thereby become an
American.”
30. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Call an Audible, Dan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2013, at A29
(joining with those calling on Dan Snyder, the owner of the “Washington Redskins,” to change
the name that increasing numbers of people find offensive).
31. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 41 (8th ed., 1915) (quoting DeLolme).
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Questions as to “who counts as an Indian” have scarcely disappeared.
Indeed, they have taken on special import in a number of the over-500
registered American Indian tribes35 in the United States inasmuch as they are
attempting to disenroll some of their putative membership. That is, the specific
question is not who is within the broad category of “American Indian,” a
question similar, perhaps, to deciding who precisely in the modern world
counts as a “European” or “African”—in the latter context think especially of
the status of Afrikaners in South Africa—but, rather, who count as members of
very specific tribes. For whatever reason—though one may strongly suspect
that access to revenues generated by casinos on Indian reservations is at least
part of the explanation—persons who have thought that they are members in
good standing of given tribes have been faced with attempts by tribal leaders to
remove them from the rolls on grounds that they do not, after all, meet the
prerequisites for being considered a “genuine” X.36 That is, it is even possible,
I presume, that one might be regarded as “an Indian” by, say, the United States
Census, but that no particular tribe would offer a home. One California tribe,
the Chukchansi, has been described as terminating the membership of “almost
75% of their tribe.”37 An article tellingly titled “Disenrollment Has Been the
Scourge of Tribes Since the Advent of Casino Gaming” details efforts within
the “tiny Sauk-Suiattle” tribe located in the State of Washington to “disenroll
306 members—allegedly because they are part-Filipino.”38 A spokesperson for
those challenging their disenrollment describes this as “ethnic cleansing pure
and simple,” an effort “to wash the Filipino blood out of the Nooksack
Tribe.”39 One potential victim of disenrollment has described the process as
“genocide.”40 Those who defend disenrollment no doubt offer different
analyses and descriptions.
Quite obviously, the same set of questions has been endlessly presented in
American social and legal experience with regard to other forms of racial
identity. Was, for example, Homer Plessy really an African-American and
therefore subject to being banished to the railway car reserved for that race? He

35. As of 2012, there were apparently 566 officially recognized American Tribes in the
United States. List of Federally Recognized Tribes, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_federally_recognized_tribes (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
36. See, e.g., James Dao, In California, Indian Tribes With Casino Money Eject Thousands
of Members, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A20.
37. Matt Driscoll, Comment of the Day, Disenrollment Has Been the Scourge of Tribes
Since the Advent of Casino Gaming, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.seattleweek
ly.com/news/thedailyweekly/943055-129/commentoftheday.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Gale Courey Toensing, Nooksack Indian Tribe in Disenrollment Fight, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK.COM (Apr. 11, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianet
work.com/2013/04/11/nooksack-indian-tribe-disenrollment-fight-148742.
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seems to have been what New Orleansians, who had exquisitely calibrated
ways of measuring racial identity, called an “octoroon,” that is, like Sally
Hemings, Thomas Jefferson’s inamorata,41 a person with a single black
grandparent, and therefore, under the infamous “single drop of blood” rule,
“black,” even if it appears that his appearance would have led many onlookers
to ascribe a different racial identity. That is, he might well have been able to
“pass” into whiteness had that been his desire.42 Or consider a notorious set of
citizenship cases from the 1920s, which turned on whether a “high caste”
Brahmin from India or an immigrant from Japan were “white” and therefore
eligible for citizenship under American naturalization laws that, at the time,
limited citizenship only to whites and a small category of black immigrants
from Africa.43 The answer in both cases was no.
One must also recall in this context Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, involving the operation of a federal-level affirmative
action law directed to “citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanishspeaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.”44 One of Justice Stevens’s
arguments concerned the difficulty, if not near-impossibility, of defining with
confidence those who count and those who do not with regard to the ethnic or
racial groups in question.45 Stevens described “the very attempt to define with
precision a beneficiary’s qualifying racial characteristics [as] repugnant to our
constitutional ideals.”46 It should already be crystal clear, though, this is an
utterly false statement, at least with regard to the enacted tradition of American
constitutional doctrine; nothing is more American, so to speak, than a near
obsession with precise definition of racial characteristics in determining who
counts as an X. In any event, Justice Stevens went on to suggest, with what
was undoubtedly self-conscious provocation, that “[i]f the National
Government is to make a serious effort to define racial classes by criteria that

41. See ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THE HEMINGS OF MONTICELLO 16–17 (2009).
42. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 281–338 (2003) [hereinafter INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES]; Randall Kennedy, Racial
Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2001); see generally, PHILIP ROTH, THE HUMAN STAIN
(2000); see also GORDON-REED, supra note 41, at 586–605 (noting that many of Sally Heming’s
(and, presumably, Thomas Jefferson’s) descendants chose to “pass” even as others maintained
conscious affiliation with the African-American community).
43. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206, 215 (1923) (“a high caste Hindu of full
Indian blood”); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 184, 198 (1922) (“clearly of a race which
is not Caucasian”), both cases discussed in Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
404, 412–13 (2012); see also IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE 56–77 (rev. & updated 10th anniversary ed., 2006) (discussing Ozawa and Thind).
44. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 535 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 535–36. It would presumably be far easier to identify those who are “Spanishspeaking,” but then one must explain why they deserve special preference.
46. Id. at 534 n.5.
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can be administered objectively, it must study precedents such as the First
Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935 . . . .”47
Indeed, let me confess that I believed that the collapse of affirmative action
as a policy would not be the result of the force of the philosophical or political
arguments against using it to rectify past injustice in America or to achieve
necessary diversity in a variety of institutional settings, including, very
importantly, the military. I am in basic agreement with most of the arguments
on behalf of “affirmative action” that are well set out by Randall Kennedy in
his recent book For Discrimination.48 Rather, I thought that the collapse would
be the result of the distinctly practical problems in defining who qualifies—
who counts—which, as anyone who has ever been involved in actually
administering such programs knows, can be quite excruciating.
III. ILLEGAL ALIENS AND OTHER “FILLER PEOPLE”
A particularly volatile question at present involves so-called “illegal
aliens,” i.e., the millions of people who are in this country either having
entered it illegally or, quite commonly, overstayed their visas after a fully legal
entry (and who, obviously, can be distinguished from the Rehnquistian
community of “quasi citizens”49). Do they “count”? Quite obviously they are
not part of the electorate. Indeed, neither are altogether lawful resident aliens,
though, as a matter of fact, it is not self-evident why resident aliens should be
deprived of a right to take part in decisions that clearly affect their lives.50
After all, some states prior to 1926 did allow resident aliens in the process of
becoming U.S. citizens to vote, and even now a few communities in the U.S.
do allow non-citizen suffrage in local elections.51
But consider the fact that illegal aliens, however defined, are counted as
part of the national census and, more importantly, are included in the so-called
“apportionment population” that defines how many representatives (and,

47. Id.
48. RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE
LAW (2013).
49. See, e.g., John P. Feldmeier, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Constitutional Alchemy
of the Fourth Amendment, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 521, 536–37 (1991).
50. I earlier explored some of these questions in Suffrage and Community: Who Should
Vote?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 545 (1989). Some localities allow resident aliens to vote in local
elections. David C. Earnest, Noncitizen Voting Rights: A Survey of an Emerging Democratic
Norm, Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Aug. 29, 2003, available at http://ww2.odu.edu/~dearnest/pdfs/Ear
nest_APSA_2003.pdf. The California Assembly has recently passed a bill that would allow
resident aliens to serve on juries, though Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the measure. Jennifer
Medina, Veto Halts Bill for Jury Duty by Noncitizens, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2013, at A1.
51. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1993); see also Earnest,
supra note 50.
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recall, votes in the Electoral College) states are entitled to. This is produced,
roughly, by dividing the entire “apportionment population” by 385, the number
of members of the House of Representatives remaining after 50 members are
set aside to ensure each state has their constitutionally guaranteed minimum.52
Interestingly enough, the “apportionment population” does not include the
populations of the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico, even though they are
composed overwhelmingly of United States citizens.53 As geographical
entities, however, they are not represented in Congress,54 which apparently
makes all the difference. Even though voters in the District of Columbia,
thanks to the Twenty-third Amendment, can choose three electors who will in
turn elect the President, that is apparently irrelevant so far as computing the
“apportionment population” is concerned.55 It should not occasion surprise,
incidentally, that many District of Columbia license plates include the motto
“Taxation without Representation,”56 which is simply the ability to be
“counted” when decisions to tax are made by a legislature.
A report by the Department of Homeland Security estimated that in
January 2010 there were approximately 10.8 million illegal aliens in the United
States, with approximately 2.6 million and 1.8 million residing in California
and Texas, respectively.57 Given that each state is awarded a congressional

52. Congressional Apportionment: How It’s Calculated, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/how.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2013).
53. Congressional Apportionment: Frequently Asked Questions, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/faq.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2013).
54. Id.
55. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
56. See, e.g., Tim Craig, Obama to Use D.C. ‘Taxation without Representation’ License
Plates, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/obama-touse-dc-taxation-without-representation-license-plates/2013/01/15/f91b09ac-5f5b-11e2-99406fc488f3fecd_story.html.
57. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
4 tbl.4 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_
ill_pe_2010.pdf. Two authors, writing in the Wall Street Journal in 2009, suggesting that
counting illegal aliens in the 2010 census would be unconstitutional, offered strikingly different
numbers:
According to the latest American Community Survey [produced by the Bureau of the
Census], California has 5,622,422 noncitizens in its population of 36,264,467. Based on
our round-number projection of a decade-end population in that state of 37,000,000
(including 5,750,000 noncitizens), California would have 57 members in the newly
reapportioned U.S. House of Representatives.
However, with noncitizens not included for purposes of reapportionment, California
would have 48 House seats (based on an estimated 308 million total population in 2010
with 283 million citizens, or 650,000 citizens per House seat). Using a similar projection,
Texas would have 38 House members with noncitizens included. With only citizens
counted, it would be entitled to 34 members.
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district for roughly each 700,000 residents (i.e., not citizens, let alone votingeligible citizens58), this means that California gets at least three “extra”
representatives (and electoral votes) and Texas two, thanks to their illegal
residents.
It is not a “self-evident truth,” so to speak, that illegal aliens should be
counted as part of the “apportionment population.” The reason is surely not
because they do not possess genuine interests that might well be taken into
account by truly disinterested “representatives.” They most certainly do. But I
think it is fair to suggest that the dominant theory of representation in this
country, often articulated by public officials themselves, is that their job is to
respond to, perhaps even to mirror, the preferences of voting constituents.59
Even if members of Congress in fact deviate from this model on occasion, it is
rare indeed to find members proudly proclaiming that they will vote on the
basis of what they think best for the country even if this runs contrary to the
wishes of the constituents on whom they depend for re-election.
This mode of self-presentation (and, often, actual behavior that might be
explained by an instinct for political self-preservation as well) may be
defended on the basis of an overtly normative theory of representation or, more
practically, simply by reference to a “rational choice” model that focuses on
the incentives that organize blocs of potential voters (or contributors) can
provide to officials to take their particular interests into account. If Yale
Professor David Mayhew is correct that most members of Congress are
motivated above all by the desire to be re-elected,60 then it is exceedingly
difficult to explain why those we call “representatives” would ever take into

John S. Baker & Elliott Stonecipher, Our Unconstitutional Census, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009,
at A11. It should be glaringly obvious—and a central theme of this Lecture—that the precise
numbers offered by the American Community Survey cannot be taken seriously, even if one
grants that their numbers are, broadly speaking, more accurate than those of the Department of
Homeland Security, simply given inevitable barriers in the way to conducting any census, let
alone one that requires people who are in this country illegally to admit their status. It would be
like reading a survey that allegedly determined that 22,132,469—not one more, not one less—
persons had committed adultery last year. Surely most Americans—or at least those who have
learned from NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—
BUT SOME DON’T (2012), about margins of error in public opinion polling—know that even the
best-conducted surveys can strive only for relative accuracy, which means, by definition, that
another iteration of the same poll could end up with quite different results. That being said, it
remains a powerful point to be able to say, with a certain degree of confidence, that there are
probably at least five million undocumented aliens in California, a number considerably higher
than the estimate produced by the Department of Homeland Security.
58. Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 YALE L. J. 1888, 1890–91 (2012).
59. See, e.g., Barbara Sinclair, An Effective Congress and Effective Members: What Does it
Take?, 29 AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 435 (Sept. 1996), available at http://www.congresslink.org/
print_expert_effectivecongress.htm.
60. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13–19 (1974).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

950

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:937

account the interests of non-voters, especially if, in contrast to teenagers, there
is no likelihood that they might become voters in the relatively near future.
Moreover, illegal aliens may be a classic “discrete and insular minorit[y]”61
who are often the objects of fear and discrimination by the voting population
and public officials mirroring those views. That is, active hostility replaces a
sometimes benign indifference.62 As may be true more often than we would
like to believe, the courts are no more eager to protect such minorities than are
other political institutions.63
Similar concerns might be raised with regard to American citizens who are
disqualified from voting, as is the case with convicted felons in many
American states. It is a sad play on words to say, for example, that the
prisoners herded together in Huntsville, Texas, or other centers of incarceration
in the United States are “represented” by the legislators who prevail in
elections.64 They “count” only to provide extra political power to privileged
voters (many in Huntsville who have become dependent on what might well be
called the “prison-industrial complex”). Had the Supreme Court, in the past
fifty years, ever deigned to explain what it really meant by the adage oneperson/one-vote, perhaps one could even say that such counts are

61. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See J. M. Balkin,
The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 281 (1989) (describing the significance of footnote four in
Carolene Products).
62. Professor Cohen raises a fascinating question in her contribution to this symposium.
“Somebody is doing some work to represent the interests of undocumented immigrants,” she
writes. Elizabeth F. Cohen, Dilemmas of Representation, Citizenship, and Semi-citizenship, 58
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1047, 1065 (2014). “Otherwise they wouldn’t be getting drivers licenses in
some states, being regularized by infrequent but important amnesties, and receiving various other
benefits. This is not to say that their semi-citizenship constitutes a fully just arrangement. It is
simply an observation that representation occurs in the absence of the franchise.” Id. (citations
omitted). Presumably, one could offer similar observations about almost any formally excluded
group inasmuch as there may be some people within the political system who, for whatever
reason, take up their cause. Consider, e.g., abolitionists and slaves, or members of the American
Civil Liberties Union who defend the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses. If it is important to be
reminded of such realities, it surely cannot be sufficient to become complacent, and Professor
Cohen herself reminds us that what she aptly terms “semi-citizenship” may rarely “constitute[] a
fully just arrangement.” Id. And she concludes her article by noting that “the most successful
instances of trusteeship described in this article are those that move toward or end in the
enfranchisement of different semi-citizens.” Id. at 1069.
63. See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Jr., Does Footnote Four Describe?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 197,
197–98 (1994).
64. See, e.g., Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass
Incarceration, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1241 (2012) (demonstrating the importance not
only of “who counts,” but also where they are counted).
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unconstitutional, but the Court has consistently given us a large number of
near-arbitrary decisions in lieu of genuinely coherent opinions.65
In any event, we might legitimately compare the “illegal alien” and
“disenfranchised felons” bonuses, in their practical political effects, to the
three-fifths bonus, at least in some states and legislative districts. Indeed, given
that both illegal aliens and disenfranchised felons are counted as whole
persons, it might be even more appropriately compared to the “segregation
bonus” that reinforced the post-1877 power of Southern states, returned to
white supremacy, even more than had been the case previously; each former
slave might now be counted as a whole person.66 But particularly by the turn of
the 20th century, the great majority of former slaves were denied the right to
vote in the formerly Confederate states, with dreadful consequences not only
for the affected African-Americans but for the American political system as a
whole.67 Congress was for decades significantly controlled by congressional
Southern Democrats determined to prevent any national programs from aiding
African-Americans (who were in no serious sense “constituents”).68
The text of the Fifteenth Amendment had become what James Madison
dismissively termed (referring, of course, to other parts of the Constitution) a
“parchment barrier.”69 As Justice Holmes asserted in the too-little-studied case
Giles v. Harris,70 one could scarcely expect the Supreme Court, without the
resources, as Hamilton put it, of “sword or the purse,”71 to enforce the
Amendment in the teeth of systematic state opposition, including ruthless
violence directed against those African-Americans who wished to participate
in the political process,72 coupled with no apparent will on the part of Congress
or the executive to re-engage in the arduous task of Reconstruction, i.e.,

65. Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1269 (2002). The most thorough judicial discussion can be found in Judge Kozinski’s
concurring and dissenting opinion in Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 779–88 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
66. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910 (2d ed. 1975)
(describing efforts to restrict the voting rights of former slaves).
67. Id. at 42–44.
68. IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 15–16
(2013).
69. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 245–46 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed.,
2008).
70. 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903); see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the
Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 296–97 (2000) (discussing the impact of Giles and attempts
to “airbrush” the case from the constitutional canon).
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 69, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton).
72. See, e.g., DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF,
VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 284–320 (2014).
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genuine “regime change.”73 Never has an ostensibly defeated adversary
enjoyed such political fruits that typically go only to the victorious.
It took a war to rid the country of slavery; it would take a mighty postWorld War II movement, including the violence it elicited and concomitant
belated response by both President and Congress, to make the Fifteenth
Amendment a genuine reality in American constitutional politics and therefore
to allow, say, Alabama and Mississippi African-Americans truly to count as
part of the polity. Part of that reality was the Voting Rights Act of 1965,74 now
under relentless assault by a Supreme Court that can be described as either
ignorant of, or simply indifferent to, the history of the United States with
regard to this aspect of determining “who counts” as anything more than the
mere subject of enumeration.75 With regard to the ability of even adult citizens
to vote, one cannot be confident that contemporary states are fully willing to
let every person count as a full participant in the community.76
College students, for example, have been especially subject to explicit
legal efforts denying them the right to vote in college towns, as delineated in a
New York Times editorial aptly titled “Keeping Students from the Polls.”77 It
quoted the Republican Speaker of the New Hampshire House of
Representatives, who described students as “foolish” because they “vote their
feelings” instead of being guided, as older adults presumably are, by stern
logic and the lessons of experience.78 “‘Voting as a liberal,’ he said, ‘that’s
what kids do.’”79 The relevant response, even more than attempting to
persuade them that liberal views are mistakes, which, of course, might take
years, is to say that their votes simply will not count in any venue besides that
of their original home. This response to student voters, incidentally, underlines
the importance of specific voting systems in determining what it means to
“count” or, concomitantly, not count.
The United States is in a minority at least of major countries around the
world that elects officials almost exclusively by geographical area (as well as
determination of winners by First Past The Post (“FPTP”), rather than

73. Id.
74. See, e.g., 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 160–
173 (2014) (underscoring the centrality of the Voting Rights Act to the Civil Rights Revolution).
75. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628–29 (2013).
76. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About
Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L.
REV. F. 58, 60–61, 65 (2014) (outlining several contemporary attempts by state legislatures to
exclude certain groups from electoral participation).
77. Editorial, Keeping Students from the Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2011, at A18.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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prevailing in a run-off),80 which is, among other things, why partisan
gerrymandering especially afflicts American politics. This is “American
exceptionalism” with a vengeance. If, on the other hand, we adopted a system
of nation-wide proportional representation or, even better, like Germany or
New Zealand, mixed systems of geography-based and state- or nation-wide
proportional representation,81 then it would be a matter of near indifference
whether students voted in, say, Hanover, New Hampshire, the home of
Dartmouth College, or some other locale within the state, save, of course, for
issues of local importance.
As a practical matter, geographical representation guarantees that de facto
permanent minorities, whether identified by race, ethnicity, or, just as
importantly, ideology, will not effectively “count” within the electorate even if
they get to cast ballots in the general election.82 The “real” elections will, as we
increasingly see, take place in political primaries rather than the often basically
meaningless general elections.83 It is glaringly obvious that “representatives”
have no genuine incentives to respond to the needs of illegal aliens unless, as is
sometimes the case, their voting constituents believe, for whatever reason, that
those needs should be met.84 But, increasingly, it is hard to believe that
representatives in most congressional districts within our polarized political
system have any incentive to respond to the views of voting citizens who can

80. See the valuable compilation of electoral systems around the world at Table of Electoral
Systems Worldwide, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, http://www.idea.
int/esd/world.cfm (last updated Oct. 14, 2010). See also Nils-Christian Bormann & Matt Golder,
Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2011, 32 ELECTORAL STUD. 360, 364
(2013), available at https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/es3.pdf.
81. The New Zealand system of MMP (mixed member proportional representation) is
explained at The MMP Voting System: Mixed Member Proportional, ELECTORAL COMM’N.,
http://www.mmpreview.org.nz/sites/all/themes/referendum/resources/Fact-Sheet_MMP.pdf (last
visited Jan. 8, 2014). On Germany, see Leon Mangasarian, How Germany’s Election System
Works: What to Watch for Today, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2013, 10:01 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2013-09-21/how-germany-s-election-system-works-what-to-watch-fortoday.html.
82. See James Thomas Tucker, Redefining American Democracy: Do Alternative Voting
Systems Capture the True Meaning of “Representation”?, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 357, 385–86
(2002) (concluding that geographic representation has come to contradict the basic principle that
“all powers of government must be derived from the consent of the governed” and that some form
of proportional representation would remedy the failings of geographic representation); James
Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action and [Mis]representation: Part II—Deconstructing the
Obstructionist Vision of the Right to Vote, 43 HOW. L.J. 405, 470 (2000) (noting that, under the
United States’ winner-take-all elections, votes for losing candidates are essentially “wasted”).
83. Burt Neuborne, Felix Frankfurter’s Revenge: An Accidental Democracy Built by Judges,
35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 602, 645 (2011) (arguing, among other things, that the
Supreme Court’s history of allowing major political parties to “rig” the candidate selection
process in gerrymandered districts often renders general elections “meaningless”).
84. See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text.
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easily be described as members of a permanent minority who will never
genuinely provide an electoral threat.
It is important, to be sure, that one’s vote “be counted” rather than torn up,
but it often turns out that merely having one’s vote tabulated does not come
close to providing a sense that one truly “counts” as someone, for example,
whom a so-called “representative” truly has to care about. This also captures
the distinctly different senses of “being counted,” which include, but are not
limited to, being part of an enumeration or even of the formal electorate.
Instead, one must be treated as if one has certain dignitary-legal rights that
allow persons to feel psychologically that “they count” as part of a relevant
moral, and not only numerical, community. To be told, in effect, that one
“counts” only to serve the interests of others is one definition of “humiliation.”
It is relevant that Bruce Ackerman, in his recent book The Civil Rights
Revolution, locates the meaning of Brown v. Board of Education85 above all as
signaling an attack on what Senator Hubert Humphrey, speaking ten years later
in behalf of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, called the “monstrous humiliations
and inconveniences that racial discrimination imposes on our Negro fellow
citizens.”86
Some years ago, Sam Issacharoff and Alex Aleinikoff coined the
marvelous but disturbing term “filler people” to refer to hapless minorities who
are placed in legislative districts for the purpose of fulfilling the Supreme
Court’s mechanistic mandate of “equal population” but who are otherwise
expected to play no genuine role in selecting public officials.87 As someone
who is such a “filler person” in my congressional district that includes part of
Austin, I in no way at all feel that the invariably conservative Republican

85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. ACKERMAN, supra note 74, at 136.
87. T. Alexander Alienikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 601, 631 (1993). Pamela Karlan
explains:
The term “filler people,” which Sam Issacharoff coined, refers to the fact that because one
person, one vote requires that all districts have the same population, while the need to
avoid “packing” means that most deliberately drawn majority-nonwhite districts are
somewhere between fifty-one and sixty-five percent nonwhite, a substantial number of
other people (usually members of the white majority, but sometimes members of other
racial or ethnic groups) must be assigned to these districts in order to top off the total
population at a constitutionally acceptable level.
Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114
YALE L. J. 1329, 1342 n. 61 (2005). Although the term “filler people” might have initially been
used in the context of “racial gerrymandering,” it is obviously applicable to all instances of
gerrymandering, where the point of artful gerrymanderers is to fill a given district with just
enough reliable voters from their own party to guarantee electoral success, while at the same time
not “wasting” such voters by “packing” an excess number in those districts. Better to distribute
them in other districts while using members of the opposition party as the hapless “filler people.”
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winner is my “representative.”88 To be reduced to the status of a “filler person”
is to underscore the extent to which one does not count, save in an almost
irrelevant literal sense. Election day, in fact, exemplifies one’s humiliation at
the hands of legislative redistricters determined to assure that those with
certain political views will not count as part of the “real” electorate even as
they are counted as part of the formal electorate.
No doubt one can find ruthless examples by Democrats trying to make sure
that only a minimum of Republicans will “count” as more than “filler people.”
The overall phenomenon is surely bi-partisan, even though, as a contingent
result of the 2010 elections, it was members of the Republican Party who
achieved “one-party” control of a number of states insofar as both the
legislature and governor shared the same partisan interests, and they were thus
able to take better advantage than Democrats of the decennial reapportionment
follies.89 This helps to explain, for example, why the House of Representatives
has a 33-seat Republican majority even though Democrats nationally received
approximately 1.7 million more votes than Republican candidates.90 The most
dramatic single example of the consequences of partisan gerrymandering is
surely Pennsylvania. The very same day that saw President Obama carrying
Pennsylvania by 52% of the total vote, and Democratic Senator Bob Casey
winning re-election with more than 53%, also observed Republican victories in
thirteen out of the eighteen congressional districts.91 So much for the
proposition that all votes, as a practical matter, count equally. As Jonathan Still
argued in a brilliant article several decades ago, the only voting systems that
come close to meeting a norm of equality of voting power are those adopting

88. Indeed, as I wrote in the original draft of my Lecture, quoted by Professor Finkelman:
I can say that I don’t even know my Congressman’s name. Why should I? In no way do I
feel “represented” by him. I do not genuinely count, except in the most unhelpfully literal
sense, and this is precisely what was intended by Texas Republicans who engaged in
ruthlessly partisan gerrymandering consciously designed to make Austin the largest city
in the country without a ‘representative’ it can genuinely call its own.
Paul Finkelman, Who Counted, Who Voted, and Who Could They Vote for, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1071, 1072 (2014).
89. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 76, at 62 (quoting the state of Texas’s open admission that
redistricting measures were aimed at minimizing the Democratic votes that actually count).
90. See FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S.
SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FED. ELEC. COMM’N 3, 11 (July 2013),
available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf (showing 60,252,696
votes for House Democratic candidates and 58,541,130 votes for House Republican candidates).
91. 2012 Pennsylvania Presidential Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012election/results/president/pennsylvania/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM); 2012
Pennsylvania Senate Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/results/senate/
pennsylvania/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM); 2012 Pennsylvania House Results,
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/results/house/pennsylvania/ (last updated Nov.
19, 2012, 2:48 PM).
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proportional representation,92 a voting system with very little support in the
United States.
With due respect, one of the most surely obtuse paragraphs in the history
of the United States Reports is the following from Justice White’s plurality
opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, which, as a practical matter, gave carte blanche
to state legislatures to engage in ruthlessly partisan gerrymanders:
[T]he mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it more difficult
for a particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its
choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm. This conviction, in
turn, stems from a perception that the power to influence the political process
is not limited to winning elections. An individual or a group of individuals who
votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by
the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that
candidate as other voters in the district. We cannot presume in such a
situation, without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will
entirely ignore the interests of those voters. This is true even in a safe district
93
where the losing group loses election after election.

If one is truly “adequately represented” by whoever is elected, then it is hard to
understand the effort put into electing one candidate over another. This is
Burke’s “trustee” theory of representation with a vengeance,94 in which we
may have little or no say in choosing (or firing) our trustee but should,
nonetheless, feel that our interests are being “adequately” taken into account.
Even if one implausibly assumes that Justice White’s “perception” made a
modicum of sense a quarter-century ago, it surely makes none today. One can
be certain, though, that this empirical disconnect would have no effect on the
92. Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375, 384–85
(1981).
93. 478 U.S. 109, 131–32 (1986) (emphasis added).
94. See Edmund Burke, Mr. Burke’s Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in 3 THE WORKS AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 232, 236–37 (1852). Professor
Cohen, in her valuable contribution, suggests that this Childress Essay “speaks primarily of the
delegate model of representation and tacitly defends this model of representation,” as against the
“trustee” model of representation. Cohen, supra note 62, at 1057–58. To the extent this is true, it
is not because I necessarily reject the normative attractiveness of the trusteeship model. At the
very least, a workable republican form of government depends on the ability of ordinary citizens,
let alone their leaders, to discipline their own selfish egoistic preferences on behalf of some kind
of commitment to the “public interest.” This point is well made in a recent book by HÉLÈNE
LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF
THE MANY 192 (2013) (“[O]ne can expect that [citizens] will go beyond their own self-interest
and toward the good of the community as a whole”). The central problem may be the ability of
self-interested groups of citizens, perhaps those identified as “factions” by James Madison, see
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 69, at 49 (James Madison), to play a decisive role in
electoral politics and thus generate “representatives” who feel constrained to mirror the
preferences of their most avid supporters. Full discussion of this point could obviously take a
book of its own.
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current Supreme Court, which often “deems” things to be true that lack any
foundation in demonstrable reality.
My illustrations so far have been taken from what might be described as
standard-form American politics of the kind that lend themselves to litigation
and, with some frequency, important decisions by the United States Supreme
Court. There are full-scale courses taught at a number of law schools on
election law or, perhaps sarcastically, “the law of democracy,” that include
copious references to many decisions of the Supreme Court. But I am
interested in far more than the constitutional law of the United States.
IV. WHY LOOK BEYOND THE UNITED STATES?
There were other, less Constitution or United States-oriented, stimuli that
encouraged me to choose “Who Counts?” as my title. In March of 2013, the
conservative economist Tyler Cowen wrote a remarkable column in The New
York Times critical of one aspect of the debate about immigration policy
currently roiling the country, which is how we compute the costs and benefits
attached to any particular policy.95 What was especially striking, given the
common pose of economists as descriptive positivists unconcerned with
normative questions, was Professor Cowen’s identification of the problem as
raising “an overriding moral issue”:
Imagine that it is your professional duty to report a cost-benefit analysis of
liberalizing immigration policy. You wouldn’t dream of producing a study that
counted “men only” or “whites only,” at least not without specific, clearly
stated reasons for dividing the data.
So why report cost-benefit results only for United States citizens or
residents, as is sometimes done in analyses of both international trade and
migration? The nation-state is a good practical institution, but it does not
96
provide the final moral delineation of which people count and which do not.

As already suggested, many of our great debates, as with Dred Scott and
subsequent amendments dealing with suffrage, have properly concerned “who
counts” as a part of “We the People,” and the answers might differ, for
example, depending on whether we are determining who can participate in
popular decision-making by voting, or who can claim certain rights even if,
like women in 1868 or resident aliens and children today, they cannot vote.97
Cowen’s striking comment, however, reminds us that it is less than a selfevident truth that the only people whose welfare we—that is, members of the
95. Tyler Cowen, A Profession with an Egalitarian Core, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, at
BU4.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. See Note, The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1078, 1088 (2013) (identifying several competing definitions of “The People” that have been
recognized by the Supreme Court).
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American political community—should focus on are our fellow Americans. To
be sure, perhaps the Constitution allows us to be stunningly parochial in our
accounting, but, as Cowen correctly notes, there are serious moral issues
attached to any such position.
Consider in this context a recent comment by Glenn Greenwald, whose
politics are presumably quite different from Cowen’s but who makes a
basically similar point. In an exchange with Bill Keller in The New York Times,
Greenwald writes that in deciding what classified information newspapers
should publish or agree to keep secret, he would not “give added weight to the
lives of innocent Americans as compared to the lives of innocent nonAmericans, nor would [he] feel any special fealty to the U.S. government as
opposed to other governments when deciding what to publish.”98 Perhaps one
should recall in this context Samuel Johnson’s famous comment that
“Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel,” even as we should be reminded
that in the fourth edition of his famous dictionary, he defined a patriot as
“[o]ne whose ruling passion is the love of his country.”99 But, of course, that
leaves open the question of whether “his country”—or any country (and its
citizens or residents)—deserves to be the object of unconditional commitment
to the exclusion of outsiders. To decide “who counts” and on what basis, raises
obviously fundamental questions of both political theory and the most practical
of political considerations.
Quite obviously, a number of important legal doctrines turn on whether
one is a U.S. national or an alien, including, perhaps most importantly for
millions of the latter, the possibility of being deported.100 But it is worth noting
as well the contemporary importance of doctrines where “being counted” as a
member of the rights-bearing community increasingly depends on whether one
is physically within the United States. This is most dramatic with regard to the
claimed “right” of the United States to engage in targeted assassinations via
drone strikes, even of American citizens in foreign lands who are deemed
sufficiently adverse to the interests of the United States.101

98. Bill Keller, Is Glenn Greenwald the Future of News?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/a-conversation-in-lieu-of-a-column.html?pagewant
ed=all&_r=0.
99. 2 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 158 (Heritage Press 1963);
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 527 (abr. 4th ed., Barnes &
Noble Books 1994).
100. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1050–51 (1994) (noting the importance of citizenship or alienage for
immigrants in accessing government benefits or engaging in political processes); Julia Preston,
Number of Illegal Immigrants in U.S. May Be on Rise Again, Estimates Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2013, at A16.
101. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the killing by the United States in
Yemen of Anwar Al-Awlaki, see Feisal G. Mohamed, A Farewell to Due Process: The

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

“WHO COUNTS?” “SEZ WHO?”

959

This is “most dramatic” because of the literal presence of issues involving
life or death. But consider also in this context recent debates over the gathering
of “metadata”—or, indeed, the direct tapping of phone conversations.102 These
appear to turn on whether the objects of coverage are, for example, Germans in
Germany or Brazilians in Brazil. The unspoken premise seems to be that
foreigners living abroad have no rights—or, at least, no rights under the United
States Constitution—that American officials are bound to respect. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist put it in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a case dealing
with whether Fourth Amendment constraints operate with regard to warrantless
searches by members of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency at all, that
Amendment applies only to those “who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community.”103 Outsiders are out of luck. Their
interests, at least legally speaking, are of no account.
Indeed, one of the remarkable aspects of this claim is that it extends to the
highest status members of these countries, including their Chancellors or
Presidents.104 It may be incredibly dumb—at least if there is a prospect of
getting caught—to listen in on ostensibly private cell phone conversations of
these leaders, but, presumably, they have no greater privacy rights vis-à-vis
American eavesdropping than any other member of their polity, which is to say
none at all. To suggest the opposite, Eric Posner has suggested, is to adopt a
“sneaking cosmopolitanism” on the part of the Supreme Court by which the
judiciary begins enforcing particularistic American rights even with regard to
foreigners living abroad.105 Generally speaking, though, only members of the

Assassination of Anwar Al-Awlaki, Huffington Post (Oct. 3, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/feisal-g-mohamed/anwar-al-awlaki-killed_b_989485.html.
102. See, e.g., RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE
GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 9 (2013), available at http://www.brennancen
ter.org/publication/what-government-does-americans-data.
103. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
104. See, e.g., Mark Mazetti and David E. Sanger, Tap on Merkel Provides Peek at Vast Spy
Net, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2013, at A1 (detailing wiretapping of German Chancellor Angela
Merkel); Alison Smale, Anger Growing Among Allies on U.S. Spying, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2013,
at A1 (noting anger of Brazilian President). But see RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S
REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 151–62 (Dec. 12,
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_re
port.pdf (discussing privacy protections to be granted “non-U.S. persons”); id. at 170–73
(discussing “Recommendation 19,” dealing with procedures for surveillance of “foreign
leaders”).
105. Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism 16
(Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 228, 2008), available at
http://law.uchicago.edu/files/files/pl228.pdf. I owe this reference to Anna Su, Speech Beyond
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“national demos,” which “consists of American citizens at home and abroad,
plus various quasi-citizens such as lawful permanent residents,” should be
viewed as part of the rights-bearing community (though Congress, of course,
can choose to extend certain protections to whomever it wishes).106
Can we possibly be surprised to discover a great deal of resentment at the
discovery by citizens of countries ostensibly closely allied with the United
States that they simply “don’t count” when it comes time to identify “the
people” who are protected by the Fourth Amendment or the “person[s]”
protected against arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the
Fourteenth Amendment?107 This is, obviously, not a question of whether the
United States census should include Germans, but, as suggested by Cowen and
Greenwald, whether they should “count” as members of a transnational
community with whom we are inevitably intertwined and whose interests we
are truly obliged to take into account. And, of course, even if we determine that
disregarding their rights-claims—or those of the U.S. national Al-Awlaki—is
the legally correct determination, it remains questionable, as Cowen suggests,
whether Americans should applaud a government that speaks in their name
while adopting a policy of basically blithe indifference to the moral rights of
foreigners. As any legal positivist would argue, that one has a legal right to do
something does not in the least determine that one ought to exercise that
right.108
Once one begins looking around and asking “who counts?” the examples
are almost endless. In fact, just a week before my visit to St. Louis, the
Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic in effect declared that
hundreds of thousands of persons of Haitian descent, many of them born
within the Dominican Republican, could not become citizens of the Dominican
Republic.109 Approximately 200,000 people seem potentially affected by this
decision, which has been condemned by human rights activists.110 “We the
People” of the Dominican Republican apparently do not include many natives
Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment (2013) (unpublished paper) (on file with
author).
106. Id.
107. I am grateful to Professor Philip Heymann for making this point in conversation. For one
illustration of what turns out to be U.S. untrustworthiness with regard to a willingness to breach
privacy, see James Glanz, U.S. Can Spy on Britons Despite Pact, Memo Says, N.Y. Times, Nov.
21, 2013, at A20.
108. This is one of the issues on which Professors H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin certainly
agreed. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 210–11 (3d ed., 2012) (discussing the
importance of separating law and morality); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
191 (17th prtg. 1999) (1977) (pointing out that enjoyment of a right does not depend on its
contribution to social welfare).
109. See Randal C. Archibold, Dominicans of Haitian Descent Cast Into Legal Limbo by
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2013, at A1.
110. Id.
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whom the Dominican Republic state prefers to count as being “really” Haitian.
Whether or not they will continue to be formally counted in the next census in
the Dominican Republic (perhaps as “resident aliens”), they surely believe that
they have suffered a stunning blow to their dignitary interest in “counting,” not
to mention the more practical problems attached to living in a country that
refuses to countenance the possibility of naturalization. Certain countries
ranging from Switzerland and Germany to Japan have historically been
extremely hesitant to allow naturalization, though Germany in 2000 broadened
its policy to take account of especially Turkish “guest workers” who had put
down deep roots within that country.111 But we know that the concept of
“sovereignty” has historically entailed not only control of one’s borders, but
also plenary authority to determine who is eligible for entrance into the
community. This, after all, is the point of Dred Scott.112
V. WHO IS A JEW?
As it happens, I am very interested in Israel and the operation of the socalled “Law of Return,” which grants automatic citizenship to any Jew who
emigrates to that country.113 Putting entirely to one side the extremely
important issues surrounding the extent to which Israel should be viewed as a
“Jewish state” instead of a “binational” one, composed (at least) of Jews and
Arabs who must learn to live in peace with one another in a quite small area of
land—which raises the question of who should count as a “genuine Israeli”—
there remains the vital question, “Who is a Jew?” Although it might take on

111. See Marc Morjé Howard, The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship
Law, 17 GERMAN POLITICS 41, 41, 44, 54 (2008).
112. See also New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 110 (1837), which has copious references to
such sovereign power. See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),
130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889), which upholds shockingly unjust treatment of a Chinese resident of the
United States seeking re-entry after a visit in China on the basis of the inherent sovereign power
of the United States to break its word both to the individual litigant and to China more broadly by
virtue of Congress’s passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act.
113. The initial “Law of Return” passed at the initiation of the State of Israel was amended in
1970 to provide explicitly that “[f]or the purposes of this Law, ‘Jew’ means a person who was
born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another
religion.” Law of Return amend. 2, § 4B, 5730-1970, SH No. 586 p. 34 (Isr.) [hereinafter Law of
Return], available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1950-1959/Pages/Law%20of%20Re
turn%205710-1950.aspx. Germany also had a similar law. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP
AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 170 (1992) (noting that the West German
“constitutional definition of ethnic German refugees as ‘Germans’ . . . has become, in effect, a
‘law of return’ for ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”).
Brubaker notes the insistence of Germany historically in rejecting the notion of jus soli, by which
“who counts” as a citizen is determined simply by place of birth, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, in favor of jus sanguinis, in which “who counts” is determined by the extent to which
one shares the favored ethno-national blood line. BRUBAKER, supra, at 81.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

962

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:937

heightened importance because of the existence of Israel and its Law of
Return, it would be significant even were there no State of Israel. What is an
important political/legal question in that country is an important sociological
and institutional question for many other Jews around the world.
First, the politics: “Who counts” as a member of the Jewish community
translates into an entitlement to immigrate to Israel and, quite remarkably, be
treated as a full citizen literally from the day of arrival with intention to
remain. As a matter of empirical fact, one can be completely non-observant or
atheistic in one’s theological beliefs, but remain a Jew according to Jewish
(and Israeli) law if born to a Jewish mother.114 As a matter of fact, “who
counts” under the Israeli “law of return” is considerably trickier inasmuch as
descendants of Jews, including “a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse
of a Jew, [and] the spouse of a child of a Jew” are also authorized to claim a
right of entry “except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily
changed his religion.”115 This presumably is what allowed many Russian
“Jews,” who had no Jewish education or tradition of observing traditional
Jewish law (and, quite possibly, no belief in God) to emigrate if they could
establish the requisite lineage, so long, of course, as they had never formally
adhered to another religion. It is worth noting, incidentally, that the Reform
wing of American Judaism has since 1983 rejected the exclusive emphasis on
matrilineal heritage and treats as Jewish anyone born to a Jewish father and
“raised as a Jew and [who] receives a Jewish education and celebrates
appropriate life cycle events, such as receiving a Hebrew name and becoming
bar or bat mitzvah. This also assumes that the child is being raised exclusively
as a Jew and not practicing another religion.”116 It is worth noting that at least
some children are being raised as members of two religious faiths, one of
which is Judaism.117 Does the requirement of “exclusivity” make them
ineligible for Israeli citizenship?
Hovering over any answer to the previous question is the status of “Jews
for Jesus,” if born to a Jewish mother. Are they entitled to entry? The answer,
as a matter of positive Israeli law, is no. There may be relatively few
theological propositions indelibly linked to “being Jewish,” but rejection of the

114. Law of Return, supra note 113.
115. Id. § 4A(a).
116. Patrilineal Descent, REFORM JUDAISM, http://www.reformjudaism.org/ask-rabbi-topic/
patrilineal-descent (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
117. See, e.g., Susan Katz Miller, Op-Ed., Being ‘Partly Jewish’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2013,
at A23. Her op-ed begins as follows:
In the course of a year, my family celebrates Yom Kippur, Rosh Hashana, Sukkot, Simhat
Torah, Hanukkah, Passover and many Shabbats. We also celebrate All Saints’ Day and
All Souls, Advent, Christmas, Lent and Easter. We are part of a growing movement to
raise interfaith children with both family religions.
Id.
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claims of Jesus to be the Messiah is one of them, at least from the perspective
of established leaders of those recognized as speaking for the “Jewish
community.”118 An atheist obviously has no trouble rejecting Christian
Messianism. What, however, about Brother Daniel, who was “born Jewish,”
that is, the son of a Jewish mother, but later converted to Catholicism, as was
the case, incidentally, with Aaron Lustiger,119 who at his death was Cardinal
Joseph Lustiger, Archbishop of Paris? Perhaps for obvious reasons, Cardinal
Lustiger was delighted to remain in Paris, but Brother Daniel attempted to
move to Israel under the Law of Return. His case is well described at the
Jewish Virtual Library in an entry on “Who is a Jew”:
Brother Daniel (born Oswald Rufeisen), a Jew who converted to Christianity
during the Holocaust and had become a Carmelite Monk. During his youth,
Rufeisen was active in a Zionist youth movement and fled to Vilna, Lithuania
at the start of World War II. There he worked as a slave laborer and escaped to
Mir where he worked for the police as a translator. Rufeisen took advantage of
his position and smuggled arms to his Jewish friends and helped drive the
police out from Mir before it was liquidated, saving nearly 300 Jews. Rufeisen
hid in the forest and later a convent, where he decided to convert to
Christianity. In 1962, Rufeisen, now Brother Daniel, applied to immigrate to
Israel and, after being denied, he appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court ruled that despite the fact he was born to a Jewish mother, he had since
120
converted and should not be recognized as a Jew by the State of Israel.

It would be truly bizarre if Brother Daniel, because of his heroism during
World War II, had been named a “righteous Gentile” by Yad Vashem, the
central museum devoted to the Holocaust in Jerusalem, given that that he
apparently had not converted when he performed at least some of his
wonderful acts.121
As one might expect, the “Brother Daniel case” was scarcely the last
episode involving defining who counted as a Jew within Israel. There were, for
example, hosts of refugees from the former Soviet Union—and, before that,
Ethiopia122—whose Jewish bona fides (whatever one might think might

118. See, e.g., James D. Davis, Campaign Disturbs Jewish Leaders, Sun Sentinel (Nov. 4,
2003), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2003-11-04/news/0311040018_1_jewish-groups-jewishleaders-jewish-federation.
119. John Tagliabue, Jean-Marie Lustiger, French Cardinal, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2007, at B7.
120. Rebecca Weiner, Judaism: Who Is a Jew? JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jew
ishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/whojew1.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2014). See also HCJ
72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16 PD 2428 [1962] (Isr.).
121. See Weiner, supra note 120.
122. Isabel Kershner, Second-Generation Ethiopians in Israel March Toward Dream of
Acceptance, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at 12.
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establish them) were dubious but whose welcome was politically necessary.123
And, unlike the case with refugees from Ethiopia, the immigrant community
from the former Soviet Union has had significant—and some would say
deleterious—consequences for the development of Israeli politics and the
possibility of achieving a long-term resolution of the antagonism between the
Arab and Jewish communities in Israel and Palestine. There might be few
better examples of what Benedict Anderson famously called “imagined
communities,”124 which only underlines the extent to which “peoplehood” is
truly a socially and politically constructed category. And this suggests that
power—and not simply debate—will account for the decisions that are actually
made.
VI. ON “ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPTS”: DO FETUSES AND ORCAS
COUNT, AND WHY OR WHY NOT?
It is worth noting that what remains probably the most profoundly divisive
issue in American politics centrally requires one to determine “who counts.”
Thus, whatever other questions are raised by the issue of abortion, the most
fundamental is whether—or perhaps when—an embryo becomes a “person”
who is, under the Constitution (or simply most philosophical systems), entitled
to some degree of protection.125 Consider in this context the Life at Conception
Act of 2013, introduced by sixteen Republican senators, which provides that
“[t]he terms ‘human person’ and ‘human being’ include each member of the
species homo sapiens at all stages of life, including the moment of fertilization,
cloning, or other moment at which an individual member of the human species
comes into being.”126 An obvious question is whether these “persons” are to
count in the “reapportionment census,” especially if they are being carried by
American citizens who will presumably pass along their status as members of
the American political community to the newborns at birth. If one agrees with
the sponsors of the Life at Conception Act (which perhaps should be renamed
the “Personhood at Conception Act”), it seems easier to defend including these
not-yet-fully-emerged-but-nonetheless-legal-persons within the apportionment
census than to defend including illegal aliens.
Consider as well in this context two recent, albeit so far unsuccessful,
lawsuits that have been filed in behalf of non-humans. The first, reported in a
New York Times story tellingly titled The Humanity of Nonhumans, describes

123. See, e.g., Masha Zur Glozman, The Million Russians That Changed Israel to Its Core,
HAARETZ (Jan. 4, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/the-millionrussians-that-changed-israel-to-its-core.premium-1.491885.
124. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 5–6 (rev. ed., 1991).
125. John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (1970).
126. Life at Conception Act, S. 583, 113th Cong. § 3(1) (2013).
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claims for writs of habeas corpus filed by the Nonhuman Rights Project “on
behalf of four captive chimpanzees.”127 The lawyers relied “heavily on
science,” particularly with regard to “what research says about the lives,
thinking ability and self-awareness of chimpanzees.”128 The article also
referred to a conference held at Yale on December 6–8, 2013 on “Personhood
Beyond the Human,” which, by definition, invites us to expand our ordinary
categories of “who counts” as a “person.”129 Quite obviously, such an
expansion raises extremely complicated questions of philosophy, not to
mention politics. It can occasion no surprise not only that the New York State
trial judge quickly dismissed the suit, though noting that the lawyers’
“impassioned representations to the Court are quite impressive,” but also that
the Project has immediately announced that it is appealing the decision to the
next rung of the state judiciary.130
One might also mull over a lawsuit filed by People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals claiming that orcas kept at SeaWorld and other such
venues have a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment’s seemingly nearabsolute ban on slavery.131 After all, the text of the Amendment categorically
prohibits “slavery” and “involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”132 Is it dispositive

127. James Gorman, The Humanity of Nonhumans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2013, at D1.
128. Id.
129. Id. at D5.
130. Nonhuman Rights Project Advances to New York Appellate Courts in Three Chimpanzee
Rights Cases, YAHOO FIN. (Dec. 10, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/nonhumanrights-project-advances-york-202245109.html.
131. See David Crary & Julie Watson, PETA Lawsuit Seeks to Expand Animal Rights, YAHOO
NEWS (Oct. 25, 2011, 6:22 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/peta-lawsuit-seeks-expand-animal-rights222219887.html (“People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals [PETA] is accusing the SeaWorld
parks of keeping five star-performer whales in conditions that violate the 13th Amendment ban
on slavery.”). According to the lawyer for PETA: “By any definition, these orcas are slaves—
kidnapped from their homes, kept confined, denied everything that’s natural to them and forced to
perform tricks for SeaWorld’s profit.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he males have their sperm collected, the
females are artificially inseminated and forced to bear young which are sometimes shipped
away.” Id. Not surprisingly, SeaWorld sees things quite differently, calling the use of the
Thirteenth Amendment “baseless and in many ways offensive.” Id. In addition to the differences
between keeping whales and human beings in captivity, the company explained that its treatment
of the whales could not be like slavery because “SeaWorld is among the world’s most respected
zoological institutions . . . . There is no higher priority than the welfare of the animals entrusted to
our care and no facility sets higher standards in husbandry, veterinary care and enrichment.” Id.
Those who have produced the film Blackfish would certainly disagree. See Blackfish (Official
Movie Site), MAGNOLIA PICTURES, http://www.magpictures.com/blackfish/ (last visited Jan. 1,
2014). In any event, Harvard Professor Laurence Tribe has stated that “[p]eople may well look
back at this lawsuit and see in it a perceptive glimpse into a future of greater compassion for
species other than our own.” Crary & Watson, supra.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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that the orcas in question do not, at least at present, meet the criteria we use for
“persons,” a word, after all, that makes no appearance in the Thirteenth
Amendment? One can scarcely ignore the existence of persons making serious
and sophisticated arguments for “animal rights,” which, at the end of the day,
is an appeal that we count animals as part of our community of sentient beings
capable not only of feeling pain, but even, in the “higher echelons,” of entering
into genuine relationships that trigger recognizable emotional bonds (and
griefs).133 If we did regard orcas as beings with rights, we could scarcely deny
that they are in fact being kept in conditions of slavery, even if one concedes,
arguendo, that their conditions of confinement could in fact be worse than they
are. Indeed, even if one rejected 18th and early 19th century notions of
“slavery” that saw “chattel slavery” as only one form of illegitimate
domination worthy of being labeled “slavery,” one would have little difficulty
analogizing orcas to chattel slaves as opposed, say, to wage slaves.134 One
might well believe that adherents of such views are as marginal today as, say,
devotees of Garrisonian abolition were in 1830, but that hardly counts as
evidence that their arguments are foolish. I suspect that almost all of us worry
about which views we now possess will be dismissed with contempt by future
generations.
So consider a quite stunning quotation from one of the great political
scientists and democratic theorists of the 20th century, the late Yale Professor
Robert Dahl. It comes from his 1970 book After the Revolution?: Authority in
a Good Society, written, as the date suggests, in the aftermath of various
important political movements attacking the socio-political status quo both in
the United States and abroad.135 “[H]ow to decide who legitimately make up
‘the people,’” he wrote, “is a problem almost totally neglected by all the great
political philosophers who write about democracy.”136 Writing four decades
later, Professor Jason Frank suggests that “the problem haunts all theories of
democracy . . . . [I]t is not a question the people can procedurally decide
because the very question subverts the premises of its resolution.”137 As Frank
notes in a brilliant analysis of Frederick Douglass, America has always

133. See, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R.
Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004). See also Gregory Berns, Op-Ed., Dogs Are People,
Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at 5 (“The ability to experience positive emotions, like love and
attachment, would mean that dogs have a level of sentience comparable to that of a human
child.”).
134. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2012) (contending that original notions of “slavery” extended to all
illegitimate domination and not only to chattel slavery).
135. ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY (1970).
136. Id. at 60, quoted in JASON FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOMENTS: ENACTING THE PEOPLE IN
POSTREVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 2 (2010).
137. FRANK, supra note 136.
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confronted the reality of marginalized, even, as Ralph Ellison so memorably
put it, “invisible” men, who have demanded entry into the group of “We the
People”—even as many of those “People” resisted, sometimes with force of
arms, any such efforts.138 Frank quotes political theorist Danielle Allen, who
writes, “Democratic politics . . . cannot take shape until ‘the people’ is
imaginable.”139 The development of the requisite imagination, though, is not an
anodyne process simply of analysis. It may be the result instead not only of
mass movements but even of violence. After all, just as Dr. Johnson noted the
clarifying effects of knowing that one is to be hung in the morning,140 being hit
by a two-by-four may also do wonders with regard to recognizing the existence
of someone one otherwise wishes to ignore (and refuse to count).
We must also recognize, though, that even if we could, as if by magic,
agree on who constituted any given community, that would only reinforce the
implausibility of claims by presumptive outsiders that they should actually be
treated as if inside. As Linda Bosniak, an astute student of issues surrounding
citizenship, puts it, “To the extent that we express our ideals of justice and
democratic belonging by way of the concept of citizenship, we need to be
particularly sensitive to the questions of exclusion implicated in the
discussion.”141 Every “inside(r)” structurally relies on an “outside(r),” who,
especially if we are devotees of Carl Schmitt, becomes potentially transformed
into a mortal enemy (or, at least, subject to our ceaseless listening in to all
conversations).142 This is precisely what made Cowen’s and Greenwald’s
moral critiques of conventional cost-benefit analysis so powerful.
But it turns out that the identity of “the people,” or even “a people,” as
with, for example, given ethnic groups or American Indian tribes, is what
political theorists have learned to call an “essentially contested concept,”
which by definition is proved impervious to definitive resolution.143 Consider
the laconic comment by the Canadian Supreme Court, in its landmark decision
examining the legitimacy, under the Canadian constitution, of claims by
Quebec that it might possess a unilateral right of secession.144 The basis of
such a claim is the ostensible right of “self-determination by the people of

138. Id. at 209–36; RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 3 (Modern Library ed. 1992).
139. FRANK, supra note 136, at 238.
140. SAMUEL JOHNSON SOUND BITE PAGE, http://www.samueljohnson.com/apocryph.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
141. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 1 (2006).
142. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26–27 (2007).
143. See W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167, 169 (1955–56); WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, Essentially Contested
Concepts in Politics, in THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 9–44 (1974).
144. In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning certain questions
relating to the secession of Quebec from Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 2 (Can.).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

968

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:937

Quebec,” to which the Court responded that “the precise meaning of the term
‘people’ remains somewhat uncertain.”145 And one reason for the contestation
is that the particular concept often has a valence, usually positive, though
sometimes negative, so that classification as a member of some community X
is thought to be either a high compliment or the assignment of a stigmatic
identity. But, quite obviously, another reason for contestation is that the
deepest considerations of practical politics, as well as abstract intellectual
concerns, may be implicated by any answer. Claims of self-determination, if
accepted, can easily create havoc in the international political system, not to
mention the lives of people on the ground who are viewed as not being within
the particular community of “selves” entitled to craft their own futures.146 Such
questions are almost stunningly obvious when we consider claims by Frederick
Douglass and other African-American leaders to be considered as part of “We
the People.”147
But consider also some of the responses in the 1840s to the so-called “Dorr
Rebellion” in Rhode Island, which turned precisely on who would count as a
member of the state electorate. Dorr and his followers, speaking in the
language of the Declaration of Independence and the importance of
government by consent of the governed—not to mention the right to establish
new forms of government to replace those that were oppressive—objected to
the highly restricted electorate established by the 1663 Charter under which
Rhode Island continued to operate into the 1840s.148 Those without property
simply did not count when determining who would lead Rhode Island.149 It did
not help that they not only failed to possess enough wealth, but many were also
Catholic immigrants (who had become citizens under U.S. naturalization
law).150 Thus free-suffrage activists were denounced by Aurilla Moffitt, the
wife of a Providence stable-keeper (who herself was, of course, deprived of the
suffrage because of her sex), for in effect delivering the state “to the tender
mercies of Roman Catholic foreigners who [could] be bought and sold by their
employers” and who were, in addition, at “the beck and call of their priests.”151
If one agreed with such descriptions, why indeed should such persons “count”
as part of the Republican political order presumably privileged by the
Constitution? Such an order rested on sturdily independent citizens, and she

145. Id. at para. 92, 123.
146. See, e.g., James Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination as a
Norm of Secession: An Assessment of the Kosovo ‘Unique Case’ Argument, 65 EUR.-ASIA STUD.
837 (2013).
147. FRANK, supra note 136, at 209–36.
148. ERIK J. CHAPUT, THE PEOPLE’S MARTYR: THOMAS WILSON DORR AND HIS 1842
RHODE ISLAND REBELLION 2–3, 30–31 (2013).
149. Id. at 30.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 81.
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expressed quite traditional concerns that such independence was lacking on the
part of those in conditions of subordination to employers or submissive to the
claims of an authoritarian priesthood (an exemplification of the kind of foreign
“potentate” whose authority had to be “repudiated” by anyone becoming a
naturalized citizen).152
Many Dorrites, including Dorr himself, were anti-slavery and supported
black suffrage, though, alas, the drafters of the so-called “People’s
Constitution,” including Dorr, ultimately concluded that political prudence—as
in Philadelphia in 1787—counseled submitting to the perception that most
Rhode Islanders were too racist to accept such a radical proposal.153
But this submission to perceived racist imperatives—which, incidentally,
led most Abolitionists to oppose the People’s Constitution—was not enough to
protect the Dorrites against nationwide condemnation from those concerned to
bolster what became known as the Slavocracy, whether because of a belief in
the virtues of slavery or, more likely, to maintain the Union by honoring the
original deal struck in Philadelphia. Thus the Madisonian, described as the
house organ of the administration of President John Tyler (who would support
the Confederacy two decades later), savaged Dorr’s “doctrine” of “numbers”
that would, if taken fully seriously, “at once convert the numberless blacks of
the South into voters, who would vote down the southern state governments at
their pleasures.”154
It is worth noting, incidentally, that the Southern slaves were not
“numberless” in the sense, say, that grains of sand or stars in the skies are. One
source, for example, states that there were exactly 2,481,390 slaves in the
American South in 1840.155 Given that the white population (plus the
population of free blacks) was considerably less than twice this amount, this
was more than enough to make even a hint of “one person/one vote”
thoroughly subversive. According to Henry Clay, for example, the capacious
answer given by Dorrites to the question “who counts” would “overturn all
social organization, make Revolution, [which should be] the extreme and last
resort of an oppressed people—the constant occurrence of human life, and the
standing order of the day.”156 After all, as he told an audience in Richmond,
Indiana while defending his own continued ownership of slaves, if slaves
became free, they might follow Dorrite doctrine and start arguing that “an
undefined majority have at their pleasure, the right to subvert an existing
government, and institute a new one in its place,” leading, Clay suggested, to

152. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 193 (2d ed. 2011).
153. CHAPUT, supra note 148, at 59.
154. Id. at 146.
155. Jenny Bourne, Slavery in the United States, EH.NET (Oct. 19, 2013), http://eh.net/ency
clopedia/slavery-in-the-united-states/.
156. CHAPUT, supra note 148, at 146–47.
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the “complete subjection to the blacks.”157 One might note, incidentally, that
just such a doctrine of the right of a majority “to subvert an existing
government” whenever necessary to achieve public happiness is enunciated in
the Declaration of Independence158 and, perhaps equally importantly, in
Federalist No. 40, where Madison defends the disregard by the delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention of the limits imposed by the Articles of
Confederation.159
One implication of this argument is that it remains crucially important to
define who is part of “the people,” “the public,” or any potential voting
majority in order to make certain that stability and the existing social order will
be maintained. Madison, after all, emphasized that the delegates to the
Convention were drawn from “patriotic and respectable citizen[s],”160 and not
the wider body of his countrymen, for whom he expressed often undisguised
contempt.161 Professor Frank tellingly quotes another Founder, John Adams,
dismissing a popular Boston mob as only “a motley rabble of saucy boys,
negroes and mulattoes, Irish Teagues, and outlandish jacktars.”162 Surely no
right-thinking civic could believe that such a motley crew could actually
“count.”
So one implication of the question “who counts” suggests that we begin
with a “candidate” for a particular designation—American, Jew, Indian,
African-American, or, beyond that, “human being” or even “member of the
trans-species community of ‘right-bearing beings’”—and attempt to construct
a conceptual apparatus that will allow us to determine the answer. In spite of
the obvious fact that there are shelves of books—and, no doubt, many seminars
in college catalogues, especially given by philosophers—devoted to
developing such concepts, one can still wonder if that is simply a fool’s errand.
The “essence” of “essentially contested concepts,” after all, is that there is no
prospect for genuine closure to arguments about what they “really mean.”

157. Id. at 147.
158. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776):
[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right
of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
159. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 291 (James Madison) (Floating Press 2011):
[I]n all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to
substance; . . . a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and
nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to “abolish or alter their
governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness . . . .”
160. Id.
161. See GARRY WILLS, JAMES MADISON 31 (2002).
162. FRANK, supra note 136, at 96.
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There is only endless argumentation, not least because there is no agreed-upon
set of facts that are determinative.
Recall DeLolme’s singular limitation of parliamentary sovereignty, the
ostensibly unbreachable division between male and female.163 Even today
there are surely some people who believe that one’s chromosomes provide a
definitive answer to the question whether one is male or female, and it is
altogether likely that even fifty years ago that would have been regarded as a
knockdown argument with regard to gender identity. Today many, perhaps
most, of us—i.e., readers of law review articles like this one—have a
considerably more complex set of understandings. Not only are chromosomes
more complicated than we once thought—the world, it turns out, is not divided
neatly between XX’s and XY’s—but we realize as well that the self-identity of
many persons is not imposed by chromosomal realities. So “who counts” as a
member of a sex- or gender- or identity-related group is now a matter of
profound debate. Just as we now accept the terms “multi-racial” and “bisexual,” with regard to sexual orientation, perhaps we will one day equally
accept “multi-sexual” or “multi-gender” with regard to sexual identity. In any
event, we find ourselves, even with regard to categories of sexuality and
gender, in the realm of “imagined communities” rather than what philosophers
would call simple “natural kinds” to which imagination must simply submit on
pain of being deemed irrational.
Just as we almost certainly will never agree on exactly what constitutes
“democracy,” for example—or, to take an example closer to the heart of law
students and professors, what is the “real meaning” of “equal protection”164—
perhaps we must recognize the futility of attempting to arrive at a single
definition of the terms I have already raised. Perhaps the best we can do is to
say that some person (or being) A is an X for certain purposes, but not for
others. This is, after all, one implication of the Equal Protection Clause itself:
If persons “similarly situated” are entitled to “equal treatment,” then it is
entailed that persons “dissimilarly situated” in some relevant respect can
receive differential treatment. Context is all.
Law students are often (rightly) confused by very specific legal rules or
doctrines that seem to be in tension, if not outright contradiction, with other
rules or doctrines. I sometimes refer to these as the “irregular verbs” within the
law; as with such verbs, which must simply be memorized inasmuch as they do
not follow standard forms of conjugation, students must memorize certain
specific legal rules rather than remain confident that they can always deduce
the correct answers by reference to some broad legal concept. Consider that

163. See supra note 34.
164. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 133 (1981) (demonstrating the existence of
108 logically possible meanings of “equality”).
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resident aliens are constitutionally entitled to serve as lawyers,165 but not as
school teachers.166 There is no good theory that explains the difference, only a
set of Supreme Court decisions in which, to be altogether accurate, one or two
“swing justices” appear to see differences that are less than obvious to the rest
of us (including the majority of their colleagues).
As law professors (and students), we are often critical of what we are
tempted to describe as irrational features of the law; I certainly do not hesitate
to denounce much of the Supreme Court’s redistricting jurisprudence as
incoherent. But perhaps we should all be more charitable, and not only because
“to err is human.” Such charity may be the implication of Justice Holmes’s
reminder that the “life of the law” is “experience,” rather than “logic,”167 and,
of course, that applies to far more than simply the life of the law. It is true of
life writ large, however frustrating that might be to system- and closureseeking academics. And experience is inevitably messy and in many ways
fundamentally illogical, at least if we try to reduce our behavior to overarching
philosophical systems with neatly rank-ordered priorities.
But, of course, one can scarcely stop here by throwing up our hands in
recognition of the complexity of the world. Decisions must be made with
regard to all of the questions posed above: Who is (and is not) a “genuine
American,” for whatever purposes; who is (or is not) a Jew, an Indian, an
African-American, or a male or female, or a “person”? Even if there are those
who believe, I think wrongly, that we should move toward a culture and law of
“color-blindness” that would rule out of order any and all references to racial
or ethnic identity, one can obviously make no sense of a demand directed to
institutional religions that they simply drop any inquiry as to whether a
proposed congregant—or rabbi, priest, or imam—is “truly” a member of the
faith community. Would we, for example, really deny the Catholic Church a
right to excommunicate persons it deems as having betrayed essential
attributes of the faith? Those who disclaim the importance of “color” as a
determinant attribute surely cannot coherently mean that one must reject any
and all attributive aspects of identity. They themselves turn out to share the
American fixation on color, even if they insist that they want to efface its
relevance. Instead we inevitably return, perhaps like moths to the flame, to the
equally frustrating question, what attributes count—or should count—in
determining “who counts”?

165. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
166. Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 69–72 (1979).
167. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (The Belknap Press of Harvard
Univ. Press 2009) (1881).
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VII. ENTER INSTITUTIONS—AND THE PROBLEM OF “SEZ WHO?”
When presented with frustrating questions, it is always tempting to believe
that the answer lies in accepting some given institution or other external
authority as the legitimate source of a definitive answer. Indeed, even the first
part of this lecture has scarcely been able to avoid reference to institutional
decisions, whether of the Supreme Court in the Rogers case or the State of
Israel with regard to eligibility under the Law of Return. And it is telling that
the 1970 amendment to that law included a laconic “definition” that purported
to settle the question of “who counts” as a Jew. This is, after all, one appeal of
dictionaries. What counts as the meaning of a particular term in a statute or the
Constitution? For Justice Scalia, especially, the purported answer often lies in
turning to a literally authoritative dictionary.168
Perhaps far more to the point is the claim by the Supreme Court of the
United States itself that disputes as to legal meanings are to be settled by
reference to its own decisions. Over the past half-century especially, the Court
has strongly insisted on its status as the “ultimate interpreter” of the
Constitution, dismissing, often with near contempt, the proposition that other
institutions, including the Congress of the United States, are entitled to their
determinations of what the essentially contestable language of the Constitution
might mean.169 Many people might be grateful; I dare say that law students are
often comforted by the perception that one can determine the meaning of Equal
Protection of the Law simply by reading an “authoritative” decision of the
Supreme Court, even if it garnered only five votes and provoked vehement
dissent.170
I have analogized this view of the Supreme Court to the role played by the
Papacy within (at least “official”) Roman Catholicism. What historically
distinguishes Catholicism from Protestantism, after all, is not only the different
emphasis placed on tradition as against the text of the Christian Bible, but also
the equally important differences of belief regarding institutional authority. For
so-called “dissenting Protestants” especially, the notion of “the priesthood of
all believers” places interpretive authority in each and every member of the
faith community.171 That is obviously altogether different from the tenets of
the Catholic Church, where authority lies in the teaching magisterium of the
Church, as instantiated in the Vatican and, ultimately, a Pope who is authorized
to issue ostensibly “infallible” pronouncements when speaking ex cathedra on

168. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 36–37 (2012).
169. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 356, 365 (2001)
(explaining that the Supreme Court, not Congress, had responsibility to define the substance of
Constitutional guarantees).
170. See, e.g., id. at 377–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171. See LEVINSON, supra note 152, at 24.
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matters of faith and morals.172 What this last question points to is that one
answer to the question “who counts” lies in referring to one or another external
authority—often an institution whose authority is self-legitimating, as it were,
rather than the demonstrated capacities of any particular members at the time.
In any event, one might hope that some suitable institution will be given—
or seize—the right to determine “who counts” as an X. That is, it will do the
counting for the rest of us, whose task now is simply to accept whatever count
ensues.173 The institutional Catholic Church, through its power not only to
baptize but, equally important in this context, also to negate one’s claimed
Catholic identification through the process of excommunication, can determine
“who counts” as a Catholic. If someone who is excommunicated asks “sez
who?” the answer is obvious and, for most people, dispositive. One may view
a specific excommunication as unjust, as with the stripping of citizenship from
a dissident, but it is hard to argue that established institutional authorities are
legally inefficacious whenever they behave unjustly. It was, for example,
difficult to proclaim that Mstislav Rostropovich, the great Russian cellist,
continued to be a Soviet citizen (as distinguished from a “Russian”) when the
then-existing Soviet state in effect expelled him from the community in
1978.174
Protestant churches obviously have more difficulty in this regard;
boundaries are far more permeable, and that is even more true with regard, say,
to what we sometimes refer to as racial or ethnic “communities.” Dismissive
terms like “oreo” or “banana” are used to denigrate the authenticity of
identities and thus the legitimacy of membership in the community for whom
the person using such terms claims to speak.175 Missourians might be
especially familiar with the term “RINO” (Republican in Name Only)
inasmuch as that has apparently been applied to former Republican Senator
John Danforth by his more “purist” conservative Republican critics.176 Recall
Jason Frank’s comment that deciding who belongs to a given people “is not a
question the people can procedurally decide because the very question subverts

172. Id. See also id. at 47.
173. This, of course, could be described as the basic issue underlying Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 102–03 (2000), i.e., the willingness to accept the recount underway by Florida officials as
determinative. The Supreme Court, of course, shut the recount down and in effect declared that
George W. Bush had won the election regardless of what any recount might show. Id. at 110–11.
174. See, e.g., Allan Kozinn, Mstislav Rostropovich, Cellist and Conductor, Dies at 80, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/arts/music/27cnd-Rostropovichcnd.
html?pagewanted=all.
175. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Response to Sanford Levinson: Who Counts?—The Politics
of Racial Membership and Excommunication, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 995 (2014).
176. See, e.g., Wes Vernon, Time for a RINO Hunt?, RENEW AMERICA (Feb. 5, 2006),
http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/vernon/060205 (identifying Senator John Danforth as a
“RINO” and describing his actions as part of an anti-conservative crusade).
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the premises of its resolution.”177 The very asking of the question can create
intellectual vertigo or what Wittgenstein notably called “mental cramps.”178
Perhaps a good example of such a “cramped” consciousness is provided by one
Elisha Potter, Jr., a militant opponent of Thomas Dorr’s Suffrage Association
and its capacious conception of who comprised “the people” of that state. After
beginning by noting the obvious absurdity that according to the tenets of the
Association the people—or, more accurately, those persons actually regarded
as having some say within a community and therefore truly “counting”—might
“include[] women as well as men,” as well as “persons under twenty one
years,” he goes on to the crux of the matter: Once one “refuse[s] to recognize
the authority of the freeholders and those who now constitute the legal voters
and undertake to define for yourselves who the people are, there is no knowing
where to stop and no possibility of agreeing upon any other limitation.”179 At
some level, Potter is right: How does one decide “where to stop” and what
“limitation[s]” will distinguish logically possible from actually communally
acceptable definitions unless one relies on some existing institutions, in that
case the body of participants authorized to participate in the polity existing in
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations by the Crown in 1663? Note well that
they had the authority to amend the Charter; there was no suggestion that a
court should decide the merits of the issue. The point, though, is that unless
and until those authorized to act in fact took relevant action, the answer to the
question “who counts” was settled, at least in the absence of “reformation” or
“revolution.”
Among other things, this means that we should look well beyond courts or
highly institutional religions with regard to determining “who counts.” Just as
examples of the problem appear ubiquitous once one starts thinking about it, so
this is true of institutions that claim to assuage our confusion by providing
firm, definitive answers. Sometimes the institutions will be explicitly “legal”
ones. Other times they will be more “ordinary” institutions that, nonetheless,
must make decisions as to “who counts” in their everyday operations.
Consider, for example, the decision by the Conservative Jewish synagogue
Temple Beth Hillel-Beth El, outside of Philadelphia, to adopt a policy of
accepting as “household” members religiously intermarried couples.180 Each

177. FRANK, supra note 136.
178. See RUSSELL NIELI, WITTGENSTEIN: FROM MYSTICISM TO ORDINARY LANGUAGE: A
STUDY OF VIENNESE POSITIVISM AND THE THOUGHT OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 202 (1987)
(referring to essentially therapeutic nature of philosophy in clearing up such “cramps” or similar
“mental discomforts”).
179. CHAPUT, supra note 148, at 70.
180. Naomi Zeveloff, Conservative Synagogues Crack Open Door to Intermarried Families:
Movement Seeks Balance Between Tradition and Greater Openness, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://forward.com/articles/142112/conservative-synagogues-crack-open-doorto-interma/.
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member of such households is entitled to vote on synagogue issues, including,
presumably, whom to hire as a rabbi or what traditional rituals should be
adhered to or modified, which means that non-Jews will have the right to cast a
vote. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this policy runs counter to that of the United
Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, the umbrella group for Conservative
congregations in America, which represents the movement’s congregations and
opposes membership rights for non-Jews.181 Even in the case of Temple HillelBeth El, though, membership rights will apparently not include the right to
serve in positions of leadership. Reform Judaism has been more latitudinarian,
beginning, of course, with the rejection of exclusive reliance on matrilineal
descent.182 Given the fact that most intermarried couples who affiliate with
Jewish institutions are likely to do so with Reform temples, the issue of joint
membership has become almost routine. And, in a 2007 essay, Rabbi Kerry
Olitzky, the head of the Jewish Outreach Institute, explicitly defended the
importance of including a vote along with more abstract membership:
If we consider the history of the United States, what really delivers citizenship
status to people is voting rights. The Jewish community is not the same as a
democratic state, yet that is what gives us more flexibility to make changes.
Consider women’s suffrage or the civil rights movement. At their core were
voting rights. And it wasn’t until women or African American citizens were
given the right to vote that real equality became a possibility for either group.
It is the same with those who come from other faith communities and live in
our midst. Until we offer them full voting rights in our institutions, no matter
what we do, they will still be considered—and feel like—second-class
183
citizens….

It is hard to better Rabbi Olitzky’s argument that “being counted” makes one
feel that “one counts” in the full dignitary sense. But, I presume, many readers
will still share a sense of perplexity at how one defines a “Jewish” (or, for that
matter, any other) community.
So take what is perhaps the most fundamental example of institutional
“counting,” which is establishing an accurate—or at least popularly accepted
and thus legitimate—number of people living within the United States. After
all, the Constitution requires the national government to “enumerate” the
population of the United States every ten years,184 and we have established a
Census Bureau to carry out the prescribed task. So to find the answer to the
question “who counts” as a member of the American community, one

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Kerry M. Olitzky, Non-Jewish Partners Deserve a Vote, WASHINGTON JEWISH WEEK
(Oct. 10, 2007, 8:59 PM), http://joi.org/bloglinks/Non-Jewish%20partners%20deserve%20a%20
vote.htm.
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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presumably turns to the Census Bureau, which tabulated the total number of
persons resident within the United States on April 1, 2010 as 308,745,538.185
These presumptively comprise the 2010 “We the People” who are part of a
common enterprise. Again, it is important to note that one should be dubious
about the sanctity of the specific number; indeed, there are many important
controversies, both technical and political, about “undercounts,” especially of
certain minorities or the homeless. Even more to the point, are earliermentioned controversies about what some might describe as an “overcount”
simply by virtue of simultaneously counting illegal immigrants at all and
concomitantly denying their membership in “We the People” by actively trying
to deport millions of them.186 Still, the Census Bureau does provide us a count,
ideally, of every human being within the geographical territory of the United
States on April 1, and nothing more than that completely contingent fact is
suggested by being lumped together. In any case, no one has (yet) suggested
that we simply ignore those figures as tainted and accept some others as legally
authoritative.
Although the most important single task of the Census Bureau is to
compute a single set of final numbers establishing the populations of the nation
at large and then the constituent sub-polities, both state and local, it also plays
a crucial role in computing as well the numbers of group members within all of
these polities. As David Kertzer and Dominique Arel put it in introducing a
fascinating collection of essays on census-taking around the world, “The
census . . . emerged as the most visible, and arguably the most politically
important, means by which states statistically depict collective identities.”187
Thus one can find a helpful map, constructed by the U.S. Census, indicating
the percentage of Hispanics by state after the 2000 census.188 The only
problem—should one say “of course”—is that deciding who is Hispanic or any
of the other myriad of racial and ethnic categories used in American discourse
and, just as importantly, American public policy, generates the most severe

185. LINDSEY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010 2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf.
186. See, e.g., PETER SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?: RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND
THE EVASION OF POLITICS 97 (2000); on specific political ramifications of an accurate count see,
e.g., Corrie MacLaggan, A Growing County Fights for Every Resident to Be Counted, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/a-growing-county-fights-for-everyresident-to-be-counted.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the efforts of Hidalgo County, Texas to
increase its enumeration).
187. CENSUS AND IDENTITY: THE POLITICS OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND LANGUAGE IN
NATIONAL CENSUSES 3 (David I. Kertzer & Dominique Arel eds., 2002) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter CENSUS AND IDENTITY].
188. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PERCENT HISPANIC BY STATE: 2000,
available at http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/thematic/pct_hisp_2000.pdf.
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cases of mental cramps.189 This is, after all, the point of Justice Stevens’s
anguished dissent in Fullilove.190 And, Professor—and former Census
Director—Prewitt is often scathing with regard to the “incoherent” categories
that we use when determining race and ethnicity within the United States.191
Moreover, the questions asked in any given census, including the
opportunity set of possible definitions, do “much more than simply reflect
social reality.”192 Instead, they play “a key role in the construction of that
reality.”193 Kertzer and Arel well describe “the census [as] a cauldron of racial
construction.”194 Although learned debates are—and, historically always have
been—held about the “science” of racial and ethnic identity, it should be
obvious that such efforts, if not entirely bogus, are inevitably doomed to failure
precisely because real political stakes are often attached to what the numbers
are purported to demonstrate. Moreover, and perhaps more ominously, the
introduction of various classifications by census bureaus has often worked to
create social divisions where previously they were dampened, if not absent.
People who previously imagined themselves as “part of the complex web of
relationships, practices, and beliefs they shared now became something quite
different. An identifiable, distinct culture was distinguished,” allowing people
not only to band together, but also (inevitably?) to begin viewing others as
Others.195
James Scott has noted the importance of census-taking to colonial
administrators, who have their own interest in strategies of dividing and
conquering. What he terms the “artificial inventions” of census takers “can end
by becoming categories that organize people’s daily experiences precisely
because they are embedded in state-created institutions that structure that
experience.”196 Thus, a sufficiently powerful state can use categories
instantiated in census-taking “not merely [as] means to make their environment
legible; they are an authoritative tune to which most of the population must
dance.” 197

189. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, For Many Latinos, Racial Identity Is More Culture Than
Color, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2012, at A11 (discussing the struggles that many Latino immigrants
have with identifying as a single, generalized race on the U.S. Census and in society).
190. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 535 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. PREWITT, supra note 22, at 7 (quoting Ian Haney López, Race on the 2010 Census:
Hispanics & the Shrinking White Majority, 134 DAEDALUS 42, 50 (2005)).
192. CENSUS AND IDENTITY, supra note 187, at 2.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 11.
195. Id. at 32.
196. Id. at 33 (quoting JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 83 (1998)).
197. CENSUS AND IDENTITY, supra note 187, at 33 (quoting SCOTT, supra note 196).
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It is unsurprising that it is no small matter for a country to be able to
conduct a popularly accepted census. Thus an article about the nearimpossibility of conducting a census in contemporary Pakistan notes the
myriad difficulties, including violence, that stand in the way.198 There has been
no national census since 1998.199 The year 2011 was supposed to be the
“Population Year,” but it did not turn out that way, not least because of the
opposition of “major parties [that] draw their power from rural
constituencies.”200 Were a new census to highlight “the extent of the country’s
urbanization, a census would lead to the creation of new urban
constituencies.”201 Another ethnically divided country, Lebanon, “did not have
a census for more than three decades after independence for fear the results
would reveal certain demographic changes that would undermine the existing
system created to balance different religious interests.”202 The “demographic
changes” referred to are not anything so banal as former farmers who have
moved to the cities, but rather, the actual numbers (and percentages) of
Muslims and Maronite Christians, who had agreed to a power-sharing
agreement in the 1943 constitution.203 The notion of “balance” is surely not
based on a “one-group/one-vote” principle, but rather, dividing up the offices
by reference to the actual membership of the groups in question.
But even states that can, more-or-less successfully, conduct censuses run
into problems of determining how to identify specific groups. Thus Melissa
Nobles, in a valuable article on “[r]acial categorization and censuses,” includes
useful discussions and appendices on the remarkable array of different terms
and categories that census takers were expected to apply in the United States
and Brazil.204 The year 1880 required census takers in the U.S. to distinguish
among those residents who were “White; Black; Mulatto; Chinese; [and]
Indian.”205 Ten years later the categories were “White; Black; Mulatto;

198. Huma Yusuf, In Pakistan, a Census Count Turns Into a Body Count, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
3, 2011, 9:58 AM), http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/in-pakistan-a-census-countturns-into-a-body-count/.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. David Abramson, Identity Counts: The Soviet Legacy and the Census in Uzbekstan, in
CENSUS AND IDENTITY, supra note 187, at 176, 198 n.14.
203. Michael Cook, The Myth of Disappearing Lebanese Christians, MERCATORNET (Feb.
20, 2013), http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/the_myth_of_disappearing_lebanese_chris
tians.
204. See Melissa Nobles, Racial Categorization and Censuses, in CENSUS AND IDENTITY,
supra note 187, at 43, 43–70.
205. Id. at 67 tbl.2.1. It is not clear whether “Indian” refers to “American Indians” or
Southeast Asians, given the earlier-quoted statement that not until the 1900 census were efforts
made to delineate the number of American Indians in the population. See supra notes 15–16 and
accompanying text.
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Quadroon; Octoroon; Chinese; Japanese; Indian.”206 By 1930, “quadroons”
and “octoroons” were dropped from the list, but “Filipino; Hindu; Korean,”
plus the opportunity to “write in” a different, presumably individually-chosen
identity, had been added.207
One way of escaping some of the dilemmas attached to requiring hapless
census takers to discern the specific identities of individuals is to allow what
has come to be called “self-identification.” For example, “I am a Jew, an
Hispanic, a male, a ___ because that is what I say I am, and who are you to tell
me that I am not?” This is the ultimate response to “sez who?”—“Sez me! (or,
for the linguistically fastidious, “Sez I!”). This may be a particularly attractive
option to those with an individualist or libertarian bent. Thus Randall Kennedy
wrote in 2003:
A well-ordered multiracial society ought to allow its members free entry into
and exit from racial categories, even if the choices they make clash with
traditional understandings of who is “black” and who is “white,” and even if,
despite making such choices in good faith, individuals mislead observers who
208
rely on conventional racial signaling.

The words “good faith” may be crucial. Thus Kennedy devotes roughly four
pages to the saga of Paul and Phillip Malone, two Boston firemen who claimed
their right to participate in an affirmative action program on the grounds, true
or not, that they had discovered that their “maternal great-grandmother” was
black (whatever exactly that means).209 Should Boston be allowed to police
these racial borders, so to speak, or is it sufficient that the Malones had rather
suddenly discovered their African-American heritage in circumstances where
that provided them a potential boon?
And consider the fact that “the number of Americans of Slovak, Croat, and
French Canadian ancestry more than doubled between the 1980 and 1990
censuses, while the number of Cajuns increased sixty-fold—all four categories
which were not listed in 1980, but were in 1990.”210 Such a list served as an
invitation either to create or acknowledge previously repressed identities. A
key issue in contemporary “census politics” involves the demand that people
be allowed to identify themselves as “multiracial,” neither X nor Y, at least if
these are thought to be mutually exclusive identities, but rather both. Such an
option has been vigorously fought by African-American organizations that,
probably rightly, see the acceptance of such a category as working contrary to

206. Nobles, supra note 204, at 67 tbl.2.1.
207. See id.
208. INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 42, at 333. I am grateful to Charles Fried for
bringing this passage to my attention.
209. Id. at 334–38.
210. David I. Kertzer & Dominique Arel, Census, Identity Formation, and the Struggle for
Political Power, in CENSUS AND IDENTITY, supra note 187, at 1, 18.
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their political or economic interests. No doubt they were relieved when
President Obama apparently chose “African-American” as his identity in the
2010 census instead of “biracial,” as the son of a white mother.211 Or consider
whether the 2020 census will include “transgender” or some other similar
category as an option. A society devoted to ensuring the “blessings of liberty”
might well find attractive the notion that those of us who make up “We the
People” should be given carte blanche in announcing what kind of people we
are. Yet it is telling that only the most utopian would suggest adopting this
kind of libertarian latitudinarianism with regard to the most basic question of
the census: “[A]re you a citizen or non-citizen of the United States?” For the
answer to that question, we continue to look to authoritative institutions,
though not the Census, to supply the one correct answer.
It should not be surprising, then, that debates over “disenrollment” within
American Indian tribes include not only abstract discussions about the nature
of identity, but also specific references to who has the authority to issue a
conclusive answer. “Who counts?” turns into the question, “Sez who?”
Consider the debate over who is a member of the Nooksack Tribe. In May
2013, Nooksack Tribal Chief Judge Raquel Montoya-Lewis held that those
protesting their disenrollment had no legal right to injunctive relief.212 She
emphasized the broad discretion granted the tribal council with regard to
decisions about tribal membership.213 Thus the doctrine of sovereign immunity
protected the sued tribal officials unless their actions “exceed . . . official
duties in a manner that verges on bad faith, not simply by making technical
errors of law.”214 Part of the controversy involves how to determine whether a
given person meets the criteria of having “one-fourth Indian blood and any
degree of Nooksack tribal ancestry.”215 Tribal officials are apparently
supporting a proposed amendment that would strike the relevant clause from
the tribal constitution.216 Tribal member Bernita Madera is described as “one
of many who support” the “efforts to remove people who never should have
been granted tribal membership in the first place.”217 The spirit of Elijah

211. See Abigail Thernstrom, Obama’s Census Identity: The President Chooses an Old-Time
Racial Classification, WALL ST. J. (April 16, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052702303720604575169783989253108.html.
212. John Stark, Tribal Judge Refuses to Block Disenrollment of 306 Nooksacks,
BELLINGHAM HERALD (May 22, 2013), http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2013/05/22/3018656/
judge-refuses-to-block-disenrollment.html.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Stark, supra note 212.
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Potter, and his anxieties about the implications of accepting radical notions
associated with the Suffrage Association,218 live on.
One can only wonder if the litigation will ultimately make its way into the
federal judiciary, perhaps even the Supreme Court, and lead to further
consideration of the implications of its famous 1978 decision in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez.219 In that case, one of the few “Indian rights cases” to inch
into the canon of general constitutional law by virtue of its testing what we
mean by “Equal Protection of the Law,” the Court in effect upheld the
Pueblo’s right to deny membership to children of a woman who married
outside the Pueblo even though children of men who married exogenously
could transfer such membership.220 The Court, through Justice Marshall,
emphasized that “[a] tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal
purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent
political community.”221 To be sure, under American law, the tribe’s “right” is
not protected against being overridden by congressional statute.222 At best,
Indian tribes are only “semi-sovereign” nations, not truly comparable, say, to
the United States or any other “sovereign nation” that, at least as a matter of
law, answers to no higher authority when deciding “who counts.” But, in the
absence of such a statute, the Pueblo does have authority.
If one acknowledges such authority in the United States, the Catholic
Church, a group of rabbis in Israel, or the United Synagogue of Conservative
Congregations—all of which are fully capable of making undoubtedly unjust
decisions—then the obvious question is why we would grant American Indian
tribes less authority to violate our own sense of propriety in essentially
contested matters. How and why does it become our business to say who is a
Nooksack, a Catholic, or a Jew, or even an American, unless, of course, we
claim some individual linkage to the community in question? And, in
particular, what business is it of ours to deny institutional authority, which in
some cases may trace back centuries or even millennia, as a means of resolving
what otherwise would be truly insoluble questions? Those of us who are
Jewish may have a personal reason to get involved in debates about “who
counts” as a Jew or who should be allowed membership (and a vote) within a
congregation, just as Catholics may similarly feel personally affected by
whether local bishops will deny them communion or even threaten
excommunication for failure to adhere to what the bishop (or, perhaps, even
the Pope) believes is an essential tenet of the faith. But why, precisely, should I
care, or, even more to the point, claim any rights to intervene, if a public figure

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

CHAPUT, supra note 148, at 70.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Id. at 51, 72.
Id. at 72 n.32.
Id. at 72.
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is denied communion because of his insufficient militance on preventing
abortions? Thus Raymond Burke, the former Catholic archbishop of St. Louis,
announced that he would deny communion to both John Kerry and Rudolph
Giuliani.223 I certainly have views about this, but should I claim any right to
call upon the state to intervene in lieu of recognizing the institutional
autonomy of the Catholic Church operating through its designated authorities?
This is most definitely not to say that we should casually defer to
institutional authority, even if its lineage goes a long way back. Brown v.
Board of Education, after all, was surely correct in its basic insight that
segregation humiliated African-Americans by telling them that they had to
remain separated from those who were truly full members of the
community.224 One can similarly endorse Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement
test” in the area of Establishment of Religion, whatever its difficulty of
application, by virtue of its recognition that the impact of apparent state
endorsement of a particular sectarian view is to lessen the belief on the part of
those outside the relevant community that they indeed fully count.225
Federalism is, after all, a particular theory of state autonomy in determining
“who counts” as members of given communities and in what ways, and one of
the overriding lessons particularly of post-World War II American
constitutionalism is the importance of limiting such autonomy in the name of
“national” (or, for some, even more transcendent) values.226 But, for better or
often for worse, we do not—and probably should not—expect all non-state
institutions to feel bound to those values.
VIII. ON INSTITUTIONAL MISTRUST
Were I to stop here, one might well be tempted to see this talk as moving
toward some kind of at least limited “happy ending,” even if it recognizes that
particular individuals may well be unhappy at the identities assigned to them
by institutional counters. Alas, I do not think that things are, relatively
speaking, so simple. Begin only by asking why we generally shift, with some
exceptions, from self-identification to institutional identification. The answer,
quite obviously, is that we are faced with a set of essentially contested
questions that, by definition, produce quite different answers. The response is
to recognize the wisdom of Thomas Hobbes, that most scary of all Englishspeaking political philosophers, who recognized that perhaps the most basic
task of the sovereign is to provide a set of unchallengeable definitions to what
otherwise would remain questions generating not only intellectual contestation,

223. Bishop Would Deny Communion to Giuliani, NEWSOK, Oct. 4, 2007, http://newsok.com/
bishop-would-deny-communion-to-giuliani/article/3140138.
224. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).
225. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
226. I am grateful to Joel Goldstein for enabling me to see this point.
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but also, as he fully experienced, civil war.227 There is more than a trace of
Hobbes in Justice Scalia, who fears the potential for anarchy in the absence of
the ability to rely on authoritative language.228
But note that Justice Scalia has also been one of the most consistent critics,
over his now almost three decades on the Court, of claims to judicial authority
itself. He has written acidly about any notion of a “living Constitution” that by
definition relies on the wisdom of judges in effect to “update” the meanings of
what Robert Jackson once notably referred to as the “majestic generalities” of
the Constitution, though he elsewhere also referred, perhaps less
inspirationally, to the “cryptic words of the Fourteenth Amendment.”229 I have
recently suggested that one can profitably distinguish two quite different
aspects of the United States Constitution: one that I call the Constitution of
Settlement, the other the Constitution of Conversation.230 To simplify
somewhat, the first refers to the hard-wired institutional features of the
Constitution—think only of the fact that we have two Houses of Congress,
with members serving different terms of office and, in the Senate, each state
having an equal number of votes.231 Among other things, these aspects of the
Constitution, which I have come to believe are in fact the document’s most
important clauses, are never litigated because there is really nothing to argue
about in terms of what they “mean” or how they should be “interpreted.”
Instead, what comprises the docket, so to speak, of both professors and
judges is the Constitution of Conversation, those parts of the document that are
in fact litigated, perhaps endlessly, and present myriad challenges of
“meaning” and “interpretation.”232 Not surprisingly, the Constitution of
Conversation, perhaps by definition, involves those parts of the Constitution
that themselves can be described as “essentially contested concepts,” such as
“Equal Protection of the Laws” or “Free Exercise of Religion,” both of which,
also unsurprisingly, inevitably raise questions about “who counts.” So why not
count on judges, say, to supply definitive answers, a la the Hobbesian
sovereign? Indeed, as noted earlier, the Court has on several occasions over the
past half-century claimed just such a role. Though he has taken part and joined
some opinions that can be described as offering a “juricentric” view of the

227. See especially SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND
INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 214–56 (expanded ed. 2004), for the most
brilliant explication of Hobbes as the author of the determinative political lexicon.
228. See Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice
Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1677–78 (1991).
229. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND
THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 15 (2012) [hereinafter FRAMED].
230. Id. at 19.
231. Id. at 23, 25–26.
232. Id. at 27.
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Constitution,233 Justice Scalia is probably more well known for his attacks on
the willingness of his colleagues to offer what he regards as merely their own
personal views as the “meaning” of the law. In some cases, Scalia would defer
almost completely to decisions of the legislature, especially, it appears, state
legislatures.234 (About Congress, he demonstrates far more concern.235) In his
“deferential” phase, though, he exhibits reticence about substituting his views
for those of another, presumably more authoritative, institution. When he does
assert judicial authority, he is apt to take refuge in arguments drawn from
purported “plain meaning” of the text236 or ostensibly clear historically derived
interpretations.237 But he always remains, at least rhetorically, the justice who
once denounced the reality of judicial “balancing” as basically horrific.238
What Justice Scalia instantiates, and I do not necessarily mean this to be
critical, is the ever-diminishing basic trust in the United States in established
institutions, one of whose central functions is to authoritatively determine
“who counts” (in what circumstances and with what weight) and other
freighted questions central to our political system. After all, as suggested
above, the Court’s systematic critique of state claims to autonomy rested not
only on abstract theories of the Constitution, but also, and perhaps far more
importantly, on the perception that one could simply not trust those who
controlled state government to give adequate weight—to count fairly—the
interests of their entire citizenry, let alone their non-citizen population. For
many the most important moment of dis-establishing state autonomy was Roe
v. Wade,239 invalidating the existing laws concerning abortion in all fifty of the
states. Yet the country has scarcely accepted the Court as the “last word” on
when protectable “life” begins, whatever the hopes expressed in the plurality
opinion by Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O’Connor in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.240 In that sense—and many opponents of
Roe would say other senses as well—there is a comparison to Dred Scott, the
233. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L. J. 1, 2 (2003).
234. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492, 2522 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676 (2012)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2710 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
236. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (analyzing the Confrontation
Clause textually).
237. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598–99 (2008).
238. “[I]t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the
importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.” Employment Division, 494 U.S.
at 889–90 n.5.
239. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
240. Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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authority of which as “law of the land” was vigorously rejected by Abraham
Lincoln (much to the consternation of Senator Stephen Douglas).241 It took a
war, and 750,000 deaths, to determine, as a constitutional matter, “who counts”
as a member of the American and state political communities.242
The Court’s own “juricentrism,” expressed across a wide swath of issues,
scarcely seems to have prevailed among the public at large, as perhaps
revealed in a July 2013 Gallup poll243 determining that more Americans (46%)
“disapprove” of the way that the Supreme Court “is handling its job” than
approve (43%). Even if this difference is well within the famous margin of
error, and even if “disapproval” is accompanied with what political scientists
call sufficient “diffuse support” to lead even critics to mutter that, nonetheless,
when the Supreme Court speaks, the rest of us must listen and obey,244 this
cannot be good news for devotees of the Supreme Court. What would be truly
interesting is knowing what Justices Scalia and Ginsburg might have told the
pollster, given their own well-publicized criticisms of the Court and, therefore,
of their colleagues.245
Deference to the Court scarcely seems to have been replaced by affection
and esteem for the other two branches of the national government. For October
2013, a summary of polls reveals that approximately 8% of Americans
“approve” of the Congress, while almost 83% “disapprove.”246 The President’s
ratings, depending on any given poll, are certainly better than his congressional
counterparts,247 but are not better than those of the Court. Only the American
military retains the confidence of most of the American public,248 a fact (or
factoid) that might provoke justified ambivalence. One might refer as well to
the other institutions mentioned in my talk today and suggest that they, too, are
suffering from their own crises of authority. The Catholic Church faces threats
not only from traditional Protestant rivals, but also from dissidents within the

241. See Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision (June 26, 1857).
242. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
243. Supreme Court, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014).
244. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Paper Delivered at the Countermajoritarian Conference,
University of Texas Law School: Public Reverence for the United States Supreme Court: Is the
Court Invincible? (March 29–30, 2012), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/magazine/wp/
wp-content/uploads/countermajoritarian/Gibson-paper2.pdf.
245. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Is ‘One of Most Activist,’ Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2013, at A1, 17.
246. Congressional Job Approval, REAL CLEAR POLITICS, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/
epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-903.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
247. The most recent Gallup poll at the time of this writing indicates a 41% approval rating,
which represents a significant drop from earlier measures. Presidential Approval Ratings—
Barack Obama, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-jobapproval.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
248. See, e.g., FRAMED, supra note 229, at 3.
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Church, even if it retains the ultimate ability to excommunicate those who
cross certain “red lines.” Just as President Obama proved less than fully
resolute with regard to his own “red line” involving the use of chemical
weapons in Syria, however, so it remains to be seen if Pope Francis, who
seems to be striving to set a new tone for the Papacy following the more
militant Pope Benedict XVI, will be so quick to count dissidents out of the
Church. One can wonder if contemporary councils within and among the many
recognized tribes within the United States will easily be able to maintain their
authority over the would-be members of those tribes. The United States
certainly retains formal authority to decide who is, and who is not, a citizen,
but it is crystal clear that it does not have sufficient authority—or perhaps even
raw power—to expel those who “don’t count” as official members of the
American community even to the extent that resident aliens most certainly do.
(Perhaps it would be as if excommunicated Catholics insisted on attending
services and taking communion.) Nor can one confidently predict the future
with regard to addressing the complexities of how we decide who qualifies for
“affirmative action” and who, on the contrary, can be legitimately excluded.
In any event, I hope I have adequately demonstrated that the question “who
counts”—inevitably accompanied by the “sez who” questions: “who does the
counting on the basis of what authority?”—is central not only to academic
political theorists, but also, and probably more importantly, to anyone
concerned with the actualities of American—or any other—politics and,
finally, to persons particularly interested in the role of law and legal
institutions in providing authoritative answers. Our futures as a political
community may depend on finding widely shared answers to both.
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